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"MINIMUM CONTACTS" AS A UNIFIED
THEORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION: A
REAPPRAISAL
STEWART JAY
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court involving
due process limitations on state court jurisdiction have emphasized that
the threshold inquiry must be directed toward determining whether
there are "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum
state. In this Article, Professor Jay denounces this defendant-oriented
approach and argues for a more balanced analysis with no a priori
weight given to one forum Professor Jay analyzes the major jurisdic-
tional cases andfinds them inherentlyflawed by a pursuit of antagonis-
tic theories of decision. He also criticizes the minimum contacts test
itself, finding that it is being used as a substitute for, and barrier to, in-
depth analysis and explanation. Professor Jay concludes by contending
that the oldjurisdictional standard, Pennoyer v. Neff, continues to im-
pede the quest for an acceptable theory ofjurisdiction.
Law professors long anticipated the official demise of Pennoyer v. Neff.'
After all, International Shoe v. Washington,2 decided in 1945, seemed to rest
on an entirely different conceptual foundation, and so it was assumed by many
that the end was only a matter of time and opportunity. Shaffer v. Heitner3
hardly came as a surprise to anyone; for some the outcome was so obvious that
the case itself could be characterized as insignificant.4 This is not to say that
commentators viewed Shaffer as answering all questions concerning personal
jurisdiction, particularly those involving property.5 Yet the consensus was
that Pennoyer's regime had come to an end. The literature appearing after
Shaffer often invoked metaphors reserved for the most significant of cases,
namely allusions to death, destruction, and rebirth. Thus we have been
treated to visions of fallen citadels, 6 nailed coffins, 7 departed friends,8 the
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1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4. Smit, The Importance of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal?, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv.
519, 520 (1979).
5. See Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 71-99 (1978).
6. Id. at 34.
7. Id.
8. Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L.
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passing of the aged, 9 collapse,1° and abandonment, 1 as well as to the usual
references to seminality.12
Perhaps in some of this we see reflected the observation of Roberto Unger
on the attraction that death exercises over life.' 3 At the very least, the labels
applied to Shaffer indicate the limited ways in which the English language can
express the thought that something important has happened. Given the enor-
mous literature following the case, 14 one pictures scores of writers searching
for some way of making their point without using the word "landmark."' 15
It was Professor Hazard who, some sixteen years ago, stressed the need
for a general theory of jurisdiction, one which would use the "minimum con-
tacts" approach of International Shoe as a basis for resolving all jurisdictional
issues. 16 His point was not merely that some cases were hard to reconcile. A
greater concern was the extent to which Pennoyer had survived in the absence
of an "acceptable alternative": 17
Pennoyer v. Neff is, to borrow a phrase from Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
not merely a venerable case. It represents a particular way of looking
at the law of jurisdiction. Its rules of jurisdiction have been gradu-
ally abandoned in detail, though in certain respects they still repre-
sent accepted law. But the conceptual structure established by
Pennoyer remains substantially intact. The questions of state-courtjurisdiction continue to be formulated much as Justice Field formu-
lated them: may the state exercise "power" or "authority" (as if these
were indistinguishable notions) over the particular person, thing, or
intangible in question (as if these were separable notions)?18
Hazard's comment was made long before Shaffer, a case which certainly
seemed to endorse the view that jurisdictional questions should be decided
according to a unified theory: "We therefore conclude that all assertions of
REV. 102, 103 (1978) (referring to Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), as being overruled by
Shaffer).
9. Leathers, The First Two Years After Shaffer v. Heitner, 40 LA. L. REV. 907, 907 (1980);
Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Process, 54 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 587, 587, 592 (1979).
10. Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: New Constitutional Questions Concerning Seider v. Roth, 6 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 393, 393 (1978).
11. Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 24 (1978).
12. Smit, supra note 4, at 519 (denying "seminal" significance).
13. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 1 (1975).
14. For a listing of articles and comments on Shaffer, see J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, & A.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 133 (3d ed. 1980); Silberman, supra note 5;
Smit, supra note 
4.
15. Nevertheless, some succumbed to the temptation. See, e.g., Leathers, Substantive Due
Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66 Ky. L.J. 1, 2 (1977); Wemer, Dropping the Other
Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Fresence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV.
565, 565 (1979); Williams, The Validity of Assuming Jurisdiction by the Attachment f/Automobile
Liability Insurance Obligations: The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner upon Seider v. Roth, 9 RuT.-CAM.
LJ. 241, 243 (1977).
16. See Hazard,-4 General Theory ofState-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241 (Kur-
land ed.).
17. Id. at 242.
18. Id. at 241 (footnotes omitted). The Shaffer opinion explicitly cited this page of the Haz-
ard article. See 433 U.S. at 199.
[Vol. 59
MINIMUM CONTACTS
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth
in International Shoe and its progeny."' 19 In turn, the Supreme Court gave a
sketch of the proper course by summarizing the treatment afforded in per-
sonam cases during the previous thirty-odd years: "Thus, the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually
exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became
the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction. '20
This method, roughly characterized by the Court as directed toward the
"fairness" 21 of the forum's exertion of jurisdiction over the defendant, was
confidently seen as being "easily applied in the vast majority of cases."' 22 That
this statement was made suggests that a hiatus of more than twenty years from
the subject had weakened the Court's grasp of the complexities involved in
applying the minimum contacts standard. Sobriety was not long in coming.
The next Term produced Kulko v. Superior Court,23 authored by Justice Mar-
shall, who had written for the majority in Shaffer. In discussing the ease by
which the International Shoe test could be applied, the Kulko Court was far
more restrained:
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonable-
ness," the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not sus-
ceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must
be weighed to determine whether the requisite "affiliating circum-
stances" are present. Hanson v. Denckla . . . . We recognize that
this determination is one in which few answers will be written "in
black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the
shades are innumerable."24
Perhaps this change of heart may be dismissed as a reflection on what
happens to opinions written during the hectic last month of the Court's year.25
And, to be sure, there is little gained by perusing the Court's pronouncements
on the clarity of its own work. What may be suggested by the quoted remarks,
and proven by more careful analysis, is that the Court has fallen short of artic-
ulating an acceptable theory of personal jurisdiction. One can even find, in
light of the cases decided by the Court after Shaffer, the vestiges of an old
scourge, Pennoyer v. Neff.
At the outset a serious question arises about the meaning of the term
"unified theory," particularly when its invocation presumes some inherent su-
periority. It can fairly be asked: superiority over what? Presumably the refer-
ence is to "something" characterized by greater discord than the supposedly
19. 433 U.S. at 212.
20. Id. at 204.
21. Id. at 211.
22. Id.
23. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
24. Id. at 92.
25. Shaffer was decided June 24, 1977; Kulko on May 15, 1978.
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"unified" theory. But "discord," like similar words expressing a sense of irrec-
oncilable diversity, is a relative term; one thing is not in harmony with an-
other. However, the question still remains: just what is it that makes them
disharmonious? Certainly it is nothing in either of the two entities under con-
sideration-when they stand alone the notion of disunity vanishes. It is the
relation-imposed on the elements-that creates the contrast.
To illustrate this point, take some of the traditional doctrines flowing
from Pennoyer. One of the most highly criticized was the rule that service of
process could not operate beyond the borders of a state.26 This result seemed
to spring naturally from Pennoyer's premise that a state's judicial command
had absolutely no authority outside of its territorial limits:
[Elvery State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory. . . . [N]o State can exer-
cise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property with-
out its territory. Story Confl. Laws, c. 2. . . . The several states are
of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies
the exclusion of power from all others. . . . [T]he laws of one state
have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed
by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its pro-
cess beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property
to its decisions.27
As a justification for limitations on process, the Court's invocation of the
principle of exclusive sovereignty neatly fit the bill. The total tab was too
much, for implicit in this conception of sovereignty was the idea that states
had complete control over the disposition of property situated within their re-
spective borders. 28 This led to the question of how absentee owners of prop-
erty would be notified of in rem proceedings when process could not transgress
state lines. Resolving the issue required a sleight of hand on the part of the
Pennoyer Court:
The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its own-
er, in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its
seizure will inform him, not only that it is taken into the custody of
the court, but that he must look to any proceedings authorized by law
upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale.29
Accordingly, the use of constructive notice-via newspaper announcement,
posting, or seizure-became the only sanctioned means of informing the ab-
sentee, even when the person's address was known. It is difficult to believe
that the Court really considered it likely that such constructive notice actually
would inform the interested absentees in any more than a handful of cases. At
best, this view of the notice requirement operated to coerce the out-of-stater
into appointing an agent to receive process. From the vantage point of over
26. "Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another State, and summon
parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them." 95 U.S. at
727.
27. Id. at 722 (citations partially omitted).
28. Id. at 723.
29. Id. at 727.
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one hundred years, such a roundabout method of notice, with its obvious
shortcomings for the impecunious or legally unastute, appears bizarre. Never-
theless, so powerful is the force of theory that the essential rationale of con-
structive notice for the in rem case was repeated as late as 1950, in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Trust Co.:30 "A state may indulge the assumption that one
who has left tangible property in the state either has abandoned it, in which
case proceedings against it deprive him of nothing. . or that he has left some
caretaker under a duty to let him know that it is being jeopardized." '3 1
Mullane reached a happy conclusion by requiring mail notice to the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of a common trust fund, including nonresidents. Notwith-
standing the result, the opinion contained a serious internal inconsistency.
The actual notice to these beneficiaries was justified by "the rule that within
the limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to
reach interested parties," 32 a rationale which surely applied to the owners of
"tangible" property. Eventually, the Court recognized in Schroeder v. City of
New York 3 3 and Walker v. City of Hutchinson34 that personal notice was re-
quired whenever the name and address-of the owner of real property was read-
ily obtainable.
By finding that nonresident beneficiaries were entitled to at least mail no-
tice, Mullane contradicted the reasoning of Pennoyer. The confines of state
boundaries had long been breached, however, by Wuchter v. Pizzutti,35 in
which the Court invalidated a nonresident motorist statute on the ground that
it did not require service "by mail or otherwise" 36 on the out-of-state defend-
ant. The justification in Wuchter presaged International Shoe; without once
mentioning Pennoyer, the Court reasoned that a failure to so notify "would
not be fair or due process" as it provided "a clear opportunity for the commis-
sion of fraud."37
After tracing a part of the Pennoyer legacy, we are in a position to clarify
what is intended by reference to a "unified theory" of jurisdiction. In one
sense, cases like Pennoyer, Mullane, and Wuchter may stand in isolation:
there is a general rule that process does not extend beyond state borders, with
exceptions for cases involving common trusts and nonresident motorist stat-
utes. Probably all of us are familiar with this kind of judicial reasoning,
namely the elaboration of a principle covering most cases, and thereafter the
development of provisions for particular fact patterns that do not fit comforta-
bly into the main scheme. Eventually someone realizes that the exceptions
overshadow the primary rule; the lattice collapses and reconstruction com-
30. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
31. Id. at 316.
32. Id. at 318.
33. 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (riparian owner entitled to notice of action affecting water rights
when name and address were readily ascertainable from public records).
34. 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (property owner should receive personal notice of condemnation
action, "even a letter," because his name was known to the city).
35. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 19.
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mences. Quite frequently the judicial side of this rebuilding starts with a
grand foundation, stated in broad language, with a few hints on how future
cases should develop. International Shoe and Shaffer v. Hleitner were precisely
those kinds of decisions.
So stated, the elaboration of a "unified theory" becomes identical with the
ordinary process of common-law development. The decisions in Mullane and
Wuchter, not to mention International Shoe, are now seen as something other
than mere exceptions to Pennoyer; rather, they strike us as being representative
of a different basis for approaching jurisdiction. Put simply, if process can
extend beyond state lines, and if the courts of one state can inquire into the
affairs of nonresidents, the doctrine of mutually exclusive sovereignties has
been directly challenged.
This is not to say that what emerges in the place of an old theory will
necessarily be "unified." Indeed the very notion of unification becomes diffi-
cult to grasp. We have a sense, particularly when under the spell of the new
consciousness which emerges from a sharp break with the past, that our theory
is more powerful than the discarded form. We say so because the theory ac-
commodates already decided cases within a workable whole, and provides a
basis for deciding those appearing on the horizon. What enables us to con-
clude that the new system is unified?
Every theory is stated in propositional form, using highly abstract words.
This is not by accident. It reflects the very nature of the language being em-
ployed. In producing a theory we necessarily engage in abstraction, the isola-
tion of particular aspects of a complex entity for purposes of generalization.
Similarly, language of any complexity depends on abstraction-the ability to
produce words that meaningfully represent more than isolated entities. Lan-
guage in turn leads to theory, not as the implication of a causal relation, but
rather as a reflection of the sense of what it means to conceptualize. Language
relates events in the world; relationship is the essence of theory.
Now, to restate the question: what entitles us to say that a propositional
statement of theory is "unified?" Isn't the very assertion that a theory is "uni-
fied" or "general" itself an exercise in theorizing? We mean to argue by such
theorizing that the unifying concept is a superior abstraction: it provides a
better way of relating the elements than rival theories. For example, the pro-
ponents of the doctrine emerging from Shaffer (including the Court) would
contend that the deciding of all jurisdictional issues under the minimum con-
tacts test provides a better means for resolving the myriad of jurisdictional
cases than the older theories, which had sharply distinguished in rem and in
personam cases.
But what is it that makes decisions under Shaffer more satisfactory than
the alternatives? Is it because cases like Harris v. Balk38 will be overruled?
Why should that result be desirable? We cannot say it is because Balk lacked
minimum contacts with the forum! That assertion would be nothing more
38. 198 U.S. 215 (1905); see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208-09.
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than a repetition of the theory, which supposedly is justified by overturning
Harris. Don't we then generate a theory to explain why Harris should have
come out differently? One argument might be that under Harris a creditor
could be sued wherever the debtor might roam. Why is that result so terrible?
Don't we have to come up with a reason for this assertion-a theory? What
justifies this latter theory-another theory? And, in all of this, what has be-
come of the "unifying" minimum contacts test?
If there is anything "unifying" about a theory, it is this: the words of the
proposition push us in certain directions. Invoking the analysis suggested by
International Shoe supposedly leads us toward solutions-and further the-
ory-that are quite unlike those obtainable under Pennoyer.39 Why does the
proposition push us in these ways? How do we know, when purporting to
decide a case under the minimum contacts test, that our result is faithful to the
original principle? Recall here that Shaffer speaks of evaluating jurisdictional
situations "according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny."''4 What tells us that we are being faithful to the standard? Here we
may not respond that the Supreme Court informs us through its decisons. Put-
ting the answer that way tells us nothing about fidelity to the standard; rather,
it informs us that what the Court says is law. How do we know when the
Court is being faithful to the standard? At some point we seem prepared to
contend that the Court is no longer following the standard, for instance, when
decisions like Wuchter and Mullane come along. What allows us to maintain
that the force of the standard has weakened? Evidently when the cases no
longer fit the mold. And how can we prove the mold has been broken or
ignored? We must be able somehow to point to a way in which the newer
cases diverge; in the process of "pointing," don't we need a means for arguing
that the result is not what was intended by the standard? Can standards have
intentions? No,people have intentions.
By this account, the degree to which the use of a particular propositional
statement (for example, the minimum contacts test) tends to produce a certain
result is a reflection of how infact the statement is employed. The lawyer or
judge who argues in favor of a decision by invoking such a statement is on the
surface contending that the facts of the case appear to be covered by the prop-
osition. At a deeper level, his expression is indicative of much more, such as
the education that is shared by the advocates and the expectations of the larger
society. The use of an expression like "minimum contacts" by a speaker is an
invitation to analyze the problem according to a particular tradition.41
In some situations this "tradition" represents an elaboration so ingrained
in a single rule that the mere statement of it effectively resolves the question.
Suppose all jurisdictional issues were determined by the following rule: "Ju-
risdiction to adjudicate lies with any court in which the plaintiff initiates the
39. See S. CAVELL, THE CLAIMS OF REASON 180-90 (1979).
40. 433 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).
41. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS 2e (Anscombe
trans. 1956).
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action." Certainly that is unified in the sense that it leaves little room for
discussion, provided the conversationalists comprehend the words. To evalu-
ate the fairness of the standard, much more is required. While American law-
yers in the late 20th century would be horrified at many of the results
obtained, a different era might find the approach perfectly acceptable. We
could imagine some future society that had made two accomplishments: (a)
transportation systems capable of moving people and objects great distances in
negligible periods of time had been developed and were accessible for modest
sums; (b) the laws of the various jurisdictions within the nation had become
uniform in all respects, at least for multi-jurisdictional conflicts. Under these
conditions, consideration of personal jurisdiction issues would be radically dif-
ferent. Critics of the rule might concentrate on the plaintifis ability to shop
for a particular adjudicator. This may or may not be a real issue; it would
depend on other factors in the society.
When we refer to the generality of a theory, then, caution is immediately
in order, for several different matters may be disguised by the expression. On
the one hand we may mean to say something about the scope of cases covered
by the theory. In itself the range of the theory implies nothing about its desira-
bility. We may instead take generality as a way of recommending particular
decisions. Used in this manner, the theory is a shorthand expression, a way of
explaining how the result fits against the entire background of the culture in
which it operates.
A theory is, to repeat, merely an abstraction, a relationship among ele-
ments. If by such abstractions we master our world, so too do we become
enslaved. Advances in theory are made possible by the use of language, but
language itself is a creature of the very abstractions involved in theorizing.
For theory to evolve we must step beyond current language, a seemingly im-
possible feat since the developing language depends on the same abstractions
being created by the theory.42 We may wonder how criticism is ever accom-
plished.
In some respects very little is accomplished. The very nature of the com-
mon law, dependent as it is on continual references to the language of past
cases, discourages theoretical innovation. An aspect of this is the inclination
of the legal system toward formalism, the mechanical repetition of prior proce-
dures solely because the practices have become firmly established. Formalism
is only one feature of the common law phenomenon. Professor Hazard's point
about the hold Pennoyer has had on generations of lawyers is indicative of
something larger: the veryformulation of issues (for example, "may the state
exercise 'power' or 'authority'?") suggests the manner in which we will go
about deciding the case. It provides the conceptual orientation for approach-
ing the issues. The words push us in certain directions. Herein also lies the
device for chaotic thinking. If the words are invitations to walk theoretical
42. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 64-65 (2d ed. 1970).
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paths, what occurs when we receive more than one invitation? What occurs is
an era ofjudicial decision-making like that which followed International Shoe.
II
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 4 3 plaintiffs had been resi-
dents of New York, where they purchased a new automobile from a retail
dealer. While driving the car through Oklahoma in route to a new residency
in Arizona, they were struck from behind by another vehicle, producing a fire
that seriously injured the plaintiffs. A products liability suit was filed in
Oklahoma state court; named as dcfendants were the dealer, its regional dis-
tributor, the importer, and the foreign manufacturer. Both the dealer and the
regional distributor contested jurisdiction on due process grounds, but the
state courts refused to dismiss. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the exercise ofjurisdiction offended the minimum contacts test.44
While the result in World-Wide is perfectly clear, the explanation pro-
vided by the Court is, with all charity, difficult to comprehend, much less de-
fend. The problem begins with the Court's formulation of the issue. Early in
the opinion the question posed is whether "an Oklahoma court may exercise in
personam jurisdiction" under these circumstances; 45 at another point the
Court speaks of the fourteenth amendment as limiting "the power of a state
court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant; ' 46
later there are references to a state court's "asserting jurisdiction over the de-
fendant." 47 Implicit in these usages is the assumption that jurisdictional issues
are resolved by testing the state's power or authority over the defendant, as
opposed to deciding whether the forum is a fair place to conduct the litigation.
Of course, it may be contended that this interpretation reads too much into a
few words-the use of these expressions can be discounted as linguistic habits
which, in context, bear little resemblance to their employment in Pennoyer.
The World- Wide Court explicitly says it is applying the minimum contacts
test.48 This rebuttal assumes, however, that the Court clearly understands its
analytical method. The thesis here is that the patterns of language used to
present the issues are indicative of fundamental conflict, caused in large part
by the simultaneous pursuit of antagonistic theories of decision.
This basic disharmony is most evident in the Court's interpretation of the
purposes served by the minimum contacts approach:
The concept of minimum contacts. . . can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
43. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
44. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented, each filing an opinion; Justice
Blackmun also joined Justice Marshall.
45. 444 U.S. at 287.
46. Id. at 291.
47. Id. at 293.
48. Id. at 291.
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And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co-
equal sovereigns in a federal system. 4 9
By presenting these "two related, but distinguishable functions"50 in such an
offhand manner, we are given the impression that the conceptual marriage is
entirely obvious from past decisions. In fact, the resulting union is more akin
to an arranged wedding between the offspring of warring kingdoms.
Matters go well enough as the Court proceeds to address what is meant by
the reference to protecting defendants from inconvenient litigation. It turns
out that this branch of minimum contacts is directed toward ascertaining the
"reasonableness" or "fairness" of the forum:
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that
the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in
an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors,
including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, see
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co . ; the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, see Kulko v. Superior Court
. . .at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the
plaintiff's power to choose the forum, cf. Shaffer v. Heitner. .. ; the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient res-
olution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, see Kulko v.
Superior Court .... 51
The process described is similar to the type of multifactor analysis mentioned
in Shaffer.52 Actually, the Court's articulation of these various considerations
is more elaborate than Shaffer, and indeed more expansive, since that opinion
made no explicit reference to the interest of plaintiffs. The World- Wide Court
also acknowledges the decreasing persuasiveness of a defendant's claim of in-
convenience; quoting familiar language from McGee, the Court points to
"modern transportation and communication"5 3 as having relieved much of the
former burden stemming from litigation in distant forums.
All of this discussion concerning "reasonableness" consumes two
paragraphs of the report. The remainder of the opinion is devoted, in one way
or another, to the second function which the Court announced as being served
by the minimum contacts test: ensuring that states respect the prerogatives of
other sovereigns. World-Wide plainly indicates that the limitations imposed
by notions of sovereignty are of threshold importance, that is, these considera-
tions prevail over such matters as the convenience of the forum and the inter-
est of the forum in trying the case. Referring to the due process clause as an
"instrument of interstate federalism,"54 the Court stresses that jurisdiction to
49. Id. at 291-92.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 292.
52. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
53. 444 U.S. at 293.
54. Id. at 294.
[Vol. 59
MINIMUM CONTACTS
adjudicate may be defeated
[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location
for litigation.55
As authority for this position, the Court cites Hanson v. Denckla,56 in which
the statement was made that "[hiowever minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has
had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise
of power over him."
57
The Hanson Court justified this restriction on jurisdiction by way of Del-
phic pronouncement, saying only that it was "a consequence of territorial limi-
tations on the power of the respective States." s58 Some commentators regarded
this reference to territoriality as a bit of judicial amnesia--Chief Justice War-
ren presumably had forgotten that International Shoe was supposed to have
dashed such thoughts. So Hanson came to be regarded by many as a curiosity,
a view surely reinforced by the Court's subsequent twenty year retreat from
the subject.59
While more will be said about Hanson later in this Article,60 it should be
noted here that the Chief Justice at least indicated that he was following Inter-
national Shoe, for he cited the case in the course of making the above declara-
tions.61 On the page referred to in International Shoe the following is found:
"[The due process] clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding
a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties or relations. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff . 62
No further explanation was given in International Shoe for this reliance on
Pennoyer. Nor did the Court explain that "contacts, ties or relations" meant
something very different in Pennoyer's day. At that time the defendant's pres-
55. Id.
56. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
57. Id. at 251. In World-Wide we see a departure from the way in which the terms "mini-
mum" or "minimal" contacts were used by Hanson. Hanson identified the "minimal contacts"
standard as the threshold barrier enacted as a consequence of territorial sovereignty; issues of
"convenience" seemed to represent a set of issues not falling under this rubric. World- Wide, on
the other hand, states that the questions of "convenience" and "sovereignty" are both aspects of
"minimum contacts," see text accompanying note 49 supra, although the latter is to be given
priority. By comparison, International Shoe is closer to World- Wide in its use of the expression:
[Tihe demands... of due process... may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there. An "estimate of the inconveniences" which would result to the corporation from a
trial away from its "home" or principal place of business is relevant in this connection.
326 U.S. at 317.
58. 357 U.S. at 251.
59. See Louis, The Grasp ofLongArm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: 4 Comment on
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson andRush v. Saychuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407, 408 (1980).
60. See text accompanying notes 184-207 infra.
61. 357 U.S. at 251.
62. 326 U.S. at 319.
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ence in the forum (either real or fictional) was the key determinant ofjurisdic-
tion, which naturally followed from Pennoyer's emphasis on the independence
of sovereigns. Furthermore, International Shoe made no attempt to reconcile
Pennoyer with its explicit disavowal of territorial presence as a requirement
for jurisdiction.63
World- Wide's approval of Hanson may thus be seen as something more
than a reinstatement of a discredited outcast. Through its explicit approval of
Hanson's remarks about territoriality, the Court seems to have linked itself to
the Pennoyer tradition. Surely it could be argued, however, that the suggested
connection is nothing more than the result of an academic's game; the World-
Wide Court specifically cited Pennoyer only for the uncontroversial point that
a state need not give full faith and credit to a judgment rendered in violation
of due process.64 It is also true that World- Wide claimed to abandon "the
shibboleth that '[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established,' Pennoyer v. Neff." 6 5
Furthermore, if we look back to Shaffer, the Court there dismissed Hanson's
focus on territoriality in an almost flippant footnote:
The Hanson Court's statement that restrictions on state jurisdiction
"are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the re-
spectivp states". . . simply makes the point that the States are de-
fined by their geographical territory. After making this point, the
Court in Hanson determined that the defendant over which personal
jurisdiction was claimed had not committed any acts sufficiently con-
nected to the State to justify jurisdiction under the International Shoe
standard.66
Did Chief Justice Warren really intend merely to provide his readers with
an elementary lesson in civics? Moreover, if Hanson actually was applying
something called the International Shoe "standard," why did the Court cite the
very page of the latter opinion where Pennoyer is expressly sanctioned?
Rather than pursue such speculations, it is probably more useful to examine
World-Wide's explanation for the priority assigned to the so-called sover-
eignty function. Reading this section of the opinion is much like rummaging
through the contents of a time capsule left from another century:
[We have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrele-
vant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to
the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution
.... [Tihe Framers. . .intended that the States retain many essen-
tial attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign
power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in
turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister
States-a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of
63. Id. at 316.
64. 444 U.S. at 291.
65. Id. at 293.
66. 433 U.S. at 204 n.20. Part of the tension between Shaffer and World- Wide is undoubt-
edly a reflection that the author of the former, Justice Marshall, dissented in the latter.
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the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.67
The Court provided no authority for this constitutional theory, but it might
very well have employed Pennoyer v. Neff-the language of the last two
sentences is nothing more than a paraphrase of the portion of Mr. Justice
Field's opinion that articulated the Pennoyer view of sovereignty. 68
Shortly after making these sweeping pronouncements on the importance
of state sovereignty, the World- Wide Court quoted the familiar line from In-
ternational Shoe: "Thus, the Due Process Clause 'does not contemplate that a
state may make binding a judgment inpersonam against an individual or cor-
porate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations'. 6 9
This language is the same as that offered by Hanson in its explanation of the
"consequence of territorial limitations on. . . power."'70 As in Hanson, the
World- Wide Court neglected to mention that the line from International Shoe
concludes with a citation of Pennoyer v. Neff.7 1
These discussions of the role played by "minimum contacts" appear in
Section II of the World- Wide opinion. The final portion, Section III, begins
by telling the reader it will apply "these principles to the case at hand."72 One
might think that this means the Court will analyze both "functions" served by
"minimum contacts" as they relate to Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction. In
examining the remainder of the decision, however, it is apparent that the anal-
ysis is directed entirely toward the "sovereignty" limitation. There is not a
single reference to the kinds of issues that might come under the previously-
described heading of "fairness" or "reasonableness." The opinion even con-
cludes by pinpointing the defendant's lack of "'contacts, ties, or relations'"
with the forum as the reason for denying jurisdiction to adjudicate.73 Conse-
quently, the importance of World- Wide lies in its determination to make the
"essential attributes of sovereignty" 74 a very real barrier to state long arm ju-
risdiction. At a minimum this represents a sharp break with Shaffer's revi-
sionist historical summary of personal jurisdiction, which had made "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than
the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States" the "central concern" in
resolving jurisdictional disputes. 75 By exploring how the Court proceeds in
Section III of the opinion, we may obtain important insights into the analytical
paralysis engendered by its fixation with the past.
The Court starts by listing all of the contacts that defendants did not have
with Oklahoma: no sales, solicitations, advertising, or similar activities in the
67. 444 U.S. at 293.
68. See text accompanying note 27 supra. Particularly pertinent is this line from Pennoyer:
"The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the
exclusion of power from all others." 95 U.S. at 722.
69. 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
70. 357 U.S. at 251.
71. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
72. 444 U.S. at 295.
73. Id. at 299 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
74. Id. at 293.
75. 433 U.S. at 204. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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state; in short, "[t]hey avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of
Oklahoma law."' 76 The Court was willing to concede a sort of contact with the
forum, namely the foreseeability "that the purchasers of automobiles sold" by
defendants "may take them to Oklahoma." 7 7 But this kind of foreseeability,
"the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State," 78
was not considered sufficient to supply the threshold relationship. To sanction
jurisdiction on this ground would, in the Court's estimation, open the door for
all kinds of horrible consequences. Here the Court was bothered by the "port-
able tort" cases, in which items like tires, automobile jacks, or soft drinks
might cause injury in states distant from the place of sale.79 Jurisdiction based
on the fortuity of the product's location at the time the defect became manifest
would make the choice of forum depend entirely on "the mere 'unilateral ac-
tivity' "80 of the plaintiff, a type of contact condemned as irrelevant by both
Kulko and Hanson.81
The Court did indicate that a certain kind of foreseeability would count.
This would occur when "the defendant's conduct and connection with the fo-
rum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there,"'82 which is an expression derived from Kulko8 3 and Shaffer.84 In other
words, there must be "a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit."85 Such "clear notice" is provided when a defendant "'purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State' ";86
a defendant so acting can avoid the burdens of distant litigation through ap-
propriate countermeasures: obtaining insurance, passing anticipated costs to
customers, or severing connection with the forum.87
Apparently the Court means that this kind of predictability and risk
avoidance cannot be achieved when the location of a product is completely in
the control of the consumer, notwithstanding the likelihood that items like
automobiles will eventually be removed from the state where sale occurred.
The Court is careful at this point not to doom all products liability cases to
76. 444 U.S. at 295.
77. Id. at 298.
78. Id. at 297.
79. Id. at 296.
80. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
81. Word-Wide analogizes the "portable tort" cases to Harris v. Balk. See id. at 296. While
Harris did involve a situation in which jurisdiction depended on factors beyond the defendant's
control, the comparison ends there. The debt owed in Harris, which was the basis for the quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction, could not visit injury on others in the way a defective product can; nor did the
debt have any relation to the claim or the defendant's use of interstate commerce (whereas in
World- Wide the argument could be made that defendants participated in a nationwide system of
marketing. See text accompanying 100-03 infra).
82. 444 U.S. at 297.
83. 436 U.S. at 97-98.
84. 433 U.S. at 216.
85. 444 U.S. at 297.




dismissal from forums other than the place of manufacture or initial sale. Ex-
plicit sanction is bestowed on Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. 88 There the Illinois Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over an out-of-
state manufacturer whose defective product (a valve) had reached the state as
a component in a water heater assembled by an unrelated intermediary. Cases
of the Gray vein are distinguished because it was not the plaintiff-consumer
who had brought the product to the forum; instead, the manufacturer had
"deliver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they [would] be purchased by consumers in the forum State." 89 Presumably
the Court was aware that in Gray the record failed to reveal the existence of
any other of defendant's products in the forum;90 the Illinois court inferred
from the nature of the business that there was a reasonable likelihood of "sub-
stantial use and consumption" in the state.9 1
On one level, the reasoning is World- Wide is positively circular. If the
deciding factor is whether the defendant can "anticipate being haled into
court" in a particular state, then a contrary result in this very case would have
informed manufacturers, distributors, and retail sellers of their vulnerability.
Armed with such knowledge, they could take all of the prophylactic measures
suggested by the opinion, such as procuring insurance, adding the expense to
the price of the goods, or withdrawing from the market. Surely the "predict-
ability" of suit mentioned by the Court accounts for judicial precedents, and
undoubtedly the business community (or at least automobile dealers) would
have discerned quickly the meaning of a decision allowing Oklahoma to pro-
ceed. It may be objected that, this would have been small comfort for the
defendants in World- Wide, who could not have divined the content of the
Justices' minds. Arguments along this line only demonstrate the futility of the
"haled into court" test. Since judicial decisions supply the measure of predict-
ability, a reviewing court following this approach should deny jurisdiction
whenever the prior cases do not point precisely toward liability to suit in the
forum. This might prevent the use of a perfectly fair forum on the sole ground
that there was no precedent for jurisdiction. In short, jurisdiction would be
frozen in a perpetual status quo.
Of course, it is equally possible to view the "predictability" issue from a
plaintiffs perspective, and accordingly reach exactly the opposite conclusion.
Under this view, the knowledge charged to prospective defendants would in-
clude an awareness of the total judicial climate with respect to jurisdiction.
Therefore, since it was well known prior to World- Wide (and certainly more
so before Shaffer and Kulko) that state courts were expanding the permissible
reaches of their long arm statutes, defendants should have been aware of the
stacked odds.
Given that the "haled into court" line of analysis lends itself to exploita-
88. 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
89. 444 U.S. at 298.
90. 22 Ill. 2d at 438, 442, 176 N.E.2d at 764, 766.
91. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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tion by both defendants and plaintiffs, its utility for actual decision making
appears suspect. In practice the Court seems inclined to translate the expres-
sion into a more practical approach. Applied to World- Wide, for example, the
test of foreseeability centered on defendants' inability to control the move-
ments of their product. It did not matter that defendants could predict such
unilateral movement, and accordingly anticipate suit anywhere. Defendants
must have "some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will
not render them liable to suit"92 -in short, an ability to avoid a forum by
structuring their primary activities.
There are at least two problems with this version of the "predictability"
formula. First, it appears to make an arbitrary distinction between products
borne to forums by consumers and those (as in Gray) which travel via in-
termediaries. In the latter cases, the distributor has "deliver[ed] its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased
by consumers in the forum State," 93 thereby directly or indirectly serving the
market for its product in other states. But doesn't this place the defendant
(and the choice of forum) at the mercy of those who are beyond its control?
Can the typical manufacturer really affect the actions of intermediaries who
purchase the product for resale-particularly when the defendant's product is
a minor component in a more complex device? Implicitly the Court seems to
accept the assumption that manufacturers and distributors have this capacity,
otherwise its stress on providing defendants the option to "sever. . . connec-
tion with the State" 94 makes no sense.
In the first article to comment extensively on World-Wide, Professor
Louis agrees with the Court's apparent view: "[I]f the defendant has been
involved in the distribution of goods to the forum state, his contacts with it are
volitional and financially beneficial. Furthermore, he can presumably ascer-
tain where the goods are bound and object or make other arrangments if the
resulting multistate jurisdictional exposure is unacceptable. '95 Neither the
Court nor Professor Louis cites any authority for this presumption. Undoubt-
edly there are times when a manufacturer does exercise such control over its
product. The more usual situation might well be along the lines of what hap-
pened in Gray and Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court.96 In those cases it
was reasonably evident that the defendants were neither certain of the volume
of their products in the forum, nor able to influence the distribution process.97
92. 444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 298.
94. Id.
95. Louis, supra note 59, at 426-27.
96. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
97. See Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 442-43, 176 N.E.2d at 766; Buckeye, 71 Cal. 2d at 896-98, 904-05,
458 P.2d at 60-61, 65-66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 116-17, 121-22. The inference mentioned in the text is
drawn from these cases because in neither was it certain how many products other than the one
involved in the litigation had entered the forum. Presumably a defendant with control over in-
termediaries could at least estimate the volume; of course there is the possibility that defendants
had such data, but withheld it for strategic purposes, although this would be based on the unlikely
assumption that plaintiffs would not request the information through discovery.
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Even if this assumption is inaccurate, most manufacturer-defendants probably
applaud the widest distribution pattern for their goods,98 regardless of where
they may wander; controls of the sort mentioned in World- Wide and by Pro-
fessor Louis would seldom have any business justification.99
One could grant the Court its empirical presupposition and still disagree
with the conclusion drawn, for there is a second and more basic objection.
Why should it matter for jurisdictional purposes that the defendant might not
be able to control the ultimate destination of its product? Here we must bear
in mind that nothing in Gray or Buckeye turned on the degree of control exer-
cised by the defendant over its product. Those courts made a realistic ap-
praisal of 20th-century American economic life, and coupled it with an
investigation into whether the forum was a convenient place for the parties to
litigate:
As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products
for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable
there for any damage caused by defects in those products. Advanced
means of distribution and other commercial activity have made pos-
sible these modern methods of doing business, and have largely ef-
faced the economic sign4icance of State lines. By the same token,
today's facilities for transportation and communication have re-
moved much of the difficulty and inconvenience formerly encoun-
tered in defending lawsuits brought in other States.
Unless they are -applied in recognition of the changes brought
about by technological and economic progress, jurisdictional con-
cepts which may have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy
lose their relation to reality, and injustice rather than justice is pro-
moted ....
The principles of due process relevant to the issue in this case
support jurisdiction in the court where both parties can most conve-
niently settle their dispute . . . . [Pilaintiff, an Illinois resident, was
injured in Illinois. The law of Illinois will govern the substantive
questions, and witnesses on the issues of injury, damages and other
elements relating to the occurrence are most likely to be found
98. By contrast, it often does make economic sense for a manufacturer to control the number
of its distributors through territorial limitations. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW - AN Eco-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-67 (1976). But World-Wide is speaking of controls that essentially elimi-
nate a product from a territory. On occasion these restrictions will be justified, such as when a
manufacturer is testing a new product in a geographically controlled area, or when a producer of
perishable goods desires to restrict the area of distribution in order to insure fresh products.
99. Naturally, this rebuttal is somewhat weak. It could be countered by saying that at least
the manufacturer could, if it wanted, control product distribution. Still, the point remains that the
nature of the business enterprise demands wide distribution; if the firm intends to maximize prof-
its (and, in some instances, stay in business) it will probably not find these controls attractive.
Both the businesses in World- Wide and Gray were in similar circumstances--they depended heav-
ily on product mobility. Perhaps if it could be shown that a manufacturer had taken strong meas-
ures to keep its product from an area, this might count as a factor in determining the fairness of
using a forum in that territory. Given the extraordinary difficulty of policing such arrangements,
it is hard to see why this should be any more than a factor. Again, the issue is that market
structures are such that a manufacturer knows the inherent peripatetic nature of many products.
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here.100
The point made above by Gray is that the modem large-scale commercial
enterprise hardly considers state lines relevant. Profits are made because prod-
ucts cross boundaries to reach a large number of consumers; regardless of
whether the dealer makes direct contact with a distant state, the business bene-
fits from the broad dispersal which occurs. It makes little difference to the
business that the consumer is the one carrying the goods to other places; if
anything, the company gains from wider exposure of its product. Further-
more, certain enterprises, of which the automobile industry is one, absolutely
depend on their products being mobile in the hands of consumers. Not only
are customers attracted to vehicles by the very promise of long-distance trans-
portation, but few cars would be sold unless the buyer was assured of servicing
and spare parts in most areas of the country.' 0 '
The rebuttal offered here leaves little room for defendants like those in
World- Wide to avoid the possibility of some distant litigation, short of ceasing
their dealerships. Quite apart from the fact that the same thing could be said
in Gray, this line of reasoning overlooks what lies behind the growth of long
arm jurisdiction in areas like products liability. The great gains made by con-
sumers through the expansion of substantive liability over the makers and sell-
ers of defective goods would be effaced if the injured buyer could not afford
the burden of suit. Given the physical distance between modem manufactur-
ers/distributors and their ultimate buyers-a setup encouraged by business for
economic advantage-the danger of uncompensated loss to the consumer is
very real unless plaintiffs can compel the attendance of defendants in a reason-
able forum. As Mr. Justice Black wrote for the majority in Travelers Health
Association v. Virginia,10 2 "[tjhe Due Process Clause does not forbid a state to
protect its citizens from such injustice."' 0 3 Defendants should not be able to
100. Gray, 22 Ill.2d at 442-43, 176 N.E.2d at 766-67 (emphasis added); see Buckeye, 71 Cal.2d
at 903-04, 458 P.2d at 64-65, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21.
101. See 444 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Defendants] intentionally became part of
an interstate economic network, which included dealerships in Oklahoma, for pecuniary gain.").
Justice Marshall also observes that "local dealers normally derive a substantial portion of their
revenues from their service operations and thereby obtain a further economic benefit from the
opportunity to service cars which were sold in other States." Id. at 314.
102. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
103. Id. at 649. Professor Kalo has remarked on "the social welfare philosophy that perme-
ates the minimum contacts test":
The social welfare philosophy demands a bias in favor of the plaintiff, who more often
than not will be an individual who has suffered some form of physical or economic
injury. The minimum contacts test imposes upon the defendant the costs of going to one
forum or another, thus making it economically more feasible for a plaintiff to initiate
litigation.
Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and In Personam
PrInc#ples, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1186. Professor Kalo also argues that
the bias in favor of the plaintiff extends beyond the question of who should bear the cost
of going to one forum or another .... To the extent that a local bias in favor of or
against one party is reflected in a jury verdict, the nonresident plaintiff would be at a
disadvantage. Picture litigating a claim that a product is defective in the community in
which the defendant is a major employer. . . . [If the plaintiff is a resident of the forum]
he will be further advantaged. In this setting the idea of distributing the plaintiffs loss
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hide within their state boundaries when they have used the entire country as a
free trade zone and in the process have visited injury on those who do not
enjoy the economic fortunes derived from substantial interstate business oper-
ations.
Admittedly, this portrait of the consumer is painted in overly dramatic
tones. Taken as a class, the group includes quite a few who could afford litiga-
tion away from home. And some have argued that these days prospective
plaintiffs are better able to finance litigation as a consequence of "public and
private health, disability, income maintenance and legal service schemes, in-
cluding the contingent fee arrangement."' 104 To assess this kind of contention,
we must bear in mind that the issue relates to the extra burdens of litigation
away from home. These undeniably are significant. Someone must pay travel
expenses for lawyers, parties, and witnesses (including hotel bills and meals),
the cost of transporting evidence and documents, long distance phone calls, in
addition to hiring local counsel. Working against the plaintiff is the generally
prevailing ethical consideration that attorneys hired on a contingent fee basis
may not agree to assume liability for all expenses of the litigation, should the
case prove to be a loser.' 05 These burdens become acute when added to the
financial pressures placed on an individual who may have substantial medical
bills and employment disability resulting from the incident giving rise to the
claim. While it is true that advances have been made in providing compensa-
tion for these disruptions, there are still enormous gaps in the quantity and
quality of health and disability insurance, as well as income maintenance pro-
grams.' 0 6 At the very least, a careful study of the real effects of financing long
among society as a whole can be viewed in a more abstract manner than in the defend-
ant's community.
Id. at 1187 (footnotes omitted).
104. Louis, supra note 59, at 430. Professor Louis provides no authority for this argument,
other than his opinion that injured plaintiffs are "far less frequently" forced to settle claims pre-
maturely in order to pay their bills. Id. at 429 n.159.
105. See S. SPEISER, 1 ATTORNEYS' FEES § 2:17 (1973); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B):
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a law-
yer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer
may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of
investigation, expenses of medical exanlination, and costs of obtaining and presenting
evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
See also id., EC 5-8.
There is authority to support the lawyer's treatment of relatively indirect litigation expenses,
such as the attorney's hotel bills, telephone bills, etc., as overhead not billable to the client; see V.
COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 203-04 (2d ed.
1976); the extent of this practice is not certain, particularly when practice manuals advise lawyers
to include expenses in retainer agreements. S. SPEISER, supra, §§ 1:48, 2:22. It has also become a
"common practice" to require clients to make interim payments for expenses; some lawyers re-
quire a deposit on account of expenses. Id. at 2:22.
106. For example, in 1976 some 22.8 million Americans under age 65 had no public or private
health coverage of any kind. See 1 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 7 (1979). As to those covered
by some form of insurance, "coverage can mean a narrow or a comprehensive range of benefits, a
large deductible and co-payment, or 100 percent reimbursement by the insurer for health care
costs." Id. at 6. A gross indication of the problem is that in 1977 private health insurance met
only 45.5% of consumers' total health care bills. Id. at 14. With respect to disability income
insurance, in 1977 only 64.6 million persons (about 30% of the population) had short-term poli-
19811
NORTH CAROLINA4 LAW REVIEW
distance litigation should be forthcoming before indulging in the assumption
that any significant number of plaintiffs will find the burdens minimal.
World- Wide's impact on the injured consumer will be realized in only a
relatively small number of products liability cases; while this is a rough esti-
mate, it seems likely that the "portable tort" is responsible for far fewer claims
than those arising from a Gray scenario. Nonetheless, we should recognize the
disparity of treatment afforded to these two kinds of cases, each of which is
identical as far as the damaged plaintiff is concerned. Those who are hurt by
products purchased in the forum clear the initial barriers to litigating at home
and can rely on the "reasonableness" side of the minimum contacts standard.
They may point to such considerations as: the regulatory interest of the forum
in adjudicating the matter; the desirability of having the forum apply its own
law; the location of witnesses and other evidence; the relative burdens imposed
on the parties; the availability of alternate forums; the advantage of avoiding
multiple suits with possibly conflicting results; and the impact of forum choice
on matters outside of the lawsuit. Persons in the Woodsons' position must
simply remain silent, despite the existence of any number of arguments that
might establish their forum choice as an entirely fair one. On the facts of
World-Wide there are several such possibilities: all witnesses to the accident,
as well as the physical evidence (which is not easily transportable), are most
likely in the forum; Oklahoma has a definite interest in controlling the quality
of automobiles on its highways; plaintiffs were severely injured, potentially
making travel physically difficult; and defendants are most likely in a superior
financial position, especially when, as here, their litigation is conducted by an
insurance company. 107
Undeniably there are points favoring defendants, the most important be-
ing that the Woodsons still can pursue the manufacturer and importer in
Oklahoma courts.' 08 The difficulty is that this response comes with a double
edge. Plaintiffs may very well continue in Oklahoma and lose to a defense
(accepted by the factfinder) asserting that the explosion was due to some fault
introduced after import (for example, the negligence of the defendants who
prevailed before the Supreme Court) or was the complete responsibility of the
driver who struck them. Assuming they would not be bound by collateral
estoppel, plaintiffs might then pursue the other corporate defendants in New
York, only to be met by a potentially successful defense placing blame on
those previously exonerated. Inconsistent adjudication and judicial disecon-
eies; 19.4 million (about 9% of the population) had long-term coverage. See U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979, at 549 (percentages determined by
extrapolating from population figures; see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WORLD POPULATION: 1977 -
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES FOR THE COUNTRIES AND REGIONS OF THE WORLD 885
(1978)).
107. See 444 U.S. at 305 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Neither petitioned the Supreme Court for review, nor does it appear they entered special
appearances at the trial court. See 444 U.S. at 288 & n.3. Even if they had done so, presumably
their business contacts in all parts of the United States would have defeated any defense, or they
would have been swept under the Gray basis for jurisdiction.
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omy are the twin evils of this arrangement. 109 Realizing the possibility of
multiple defendants pointing the finger at each other, plaintiffs in the Wood-
sons' situation may be forced to a distant forum, thereby accepting the
financial consequences. Compounding the dilemma is the figure of the other
driver, who might very well have been at fault;" 10 it would be purely fortuitous
if he could be joined in the New York action.
Products liability cases are classic situations in which frequently the
plaintiff knows that someone else is liable, although the responsible party can-
not be identified without at least going through discovery, and then the contro-
versy often must be resolved by trial. The substantive doctrine in this area
allows the plaintiff to sue up the line until the culpable defendant is found.
Common sense dictates that this be accomplished in the course of one pro-
ceeding, since to do otherwise only adds to plaintiffs burdens, while promot-
ing systemic inefficiency. Despite the appropriateness of allowing the
Woodsons to sue some of the defendants in Oklahoma, the Court refuses to
consider arguments for bringing the others in, even though all of the corporate
defendants are linked together in a cooperative scheme utilizing interstate
commerce.
A contrary result in World-Wide would not necessarily have committed
the Court to endorsing the jurisdiction of any forum in which a "portable tort"
might happen to produce damage. Not every business using the avenues of
national commerce can afford to defend suits in distant forums; some number,
probably substantial, are in marginal positions, with little ability to pass extra
expenses along to consumers. 1  There is also the problem of delineating
which businesses should have to answer complaints in places where their
products happen to produce damage."t 2 Many might recoil at the thought of a
local druggist being caught in the clutches of a distant long arm statute when
the cigarette lighter he sold happens to explode on the other side of the conti-
nent. Bearing in mind that a sizable number of these local businesses would
be represented by national insurance companies, it is still possibly to argue for
some bias in favor of defendants. The point of this Article is not to define
precisely which "portable torts" should be subject to plaintiffs forum choice;
for one thing there is an existent literature on the subject."l 3 Rather, the issue
is why the Court lays down a blanket rule that effectively smothers the case-
109. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct., 71 Cal. 2d 893, 906, 458 P.2d 57, 67, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113, 123 (1969) ("[P]Iaintiffalleged in his amended complaint that he is in doubt whether his
present incapacitating hemiplegic condition was caused by the explosion or by the negligence of
the medical defendants or both. He fears that if he is required to sue defendant Buckeye in Ohio
and the medical defendants in California, the defendant(s) in each case may be able to avoid
liability for this condition by pointing the finger at the absent defendant(s).").
110. It is not clear from the record in World-Wide whether the other driver potentially is
responsible.
111. The same could be said, however, about firms that fall within the Gray category.
112. For an example of a state court carefully considering the nature of a defendant's inter-
state business, and deciding against jurisdiction, see Hasley v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 70
Wis. 2d 562, 235 N.W.2d 446 (1975).
113. See, e.g., von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A SuggestedAnalysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
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by-case development of a jurisprudence in this area. What prevents the Court
from hearing arguments that are taken to be relevant in closely analogous situ-
ations? Why are defendants ever entitled to a conclusive veto power over fo-
rum choices? Addressing this aspect of World- Wide takes us far beyond the
unfortunate victims involved. We may find, contrary to the rumors, that Pen-
noyer v. Neff is still with us.
III
World- Wide will undoubtedly attract a following; many will simply agree
that, even accounting for the interests of the plaintiffs and the forum, the bal-
ance of fairness lay on the side of defendants. 14 The focus of criticism here
will not be on those who merely favor the result; the inquiry will center on
partisans of the defendant-oriented approach adopted by the majority of the
Court. Already the Court has found one such friend in Professor Louis, who
terms the methodology "a fair and workable one."' 15
After examining the recent decisions from the Supreme Court on personal
jurisdiction, Louis concludes that "what the Court has done in these cases is to
turn the clock back to an earlier time when jurisdiction, like substantive tort
law, was concerned more with the defendant's conduct and less with notions of
social welfare and convenient risk allocation." 116 Louis fixes the destination
of this reverse time travel at Hanson v. Denckla,1 7 a decision he describes as
espousing "the rigid, old-fashioned, territorially derived view of jurisdic-
tion." 1 8 Despite this characterization of the Court's theoretical foundation,
which might be taken as disparaging, Louis applauds the "bright line test"' 19
emerging from Kulko, Shaffer, World-Wide, and Rush v. Savchuk. 120 One
reason for this appraisal-the supposedly decreasing burdens facing plaintiffs
who must litigate away from home-has already been investigated. 12' The
other justifications advanced relate to what he perceives to be the motivating
force behind the majority Justices' votes, namely the desire to "more easily
police" 22 the tendency of state courts to broaden the reach of their long arm
statutes.
Louis notes the "unparalleled expansion"' 123 that occurred in the scope of
114. Two of the World-Wide dissenters conceded the closeness of the decision. See 444 U.S.
at 313 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackman, J.): "This is a difficult case, and reasonable minds may
differ as to whether. . . the requirements of International Shoe [are met]." Justice Brennan in
dissent likewise acknowledged that the case "approach[ed] the outer limits ofInternational Shoe's
jurisdictional principle," id. at 307-08, but contended that the minimum contacts approach "may
be outdated." Id at 308.
115. Louis, supra note 59, at 409.
116. Id. at 428.
117. Id. at 409.
118. Id. at 408.
119. Id. at 432.
120. 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (holding unconstitutional the doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d
111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966)); see text accompanying notes 151-61 infra.
121. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
122. Louis, supra note 59, at 432.
123. Id. at 407.
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state court jurisdiction during the period from International Shoe to Shaffer.
Only once during this time, in Hanson, did the Court limit a state court's juris-
diction to adjudicate; for nearly two decades after Hanson the Court said
nothing directly on the subject. Increasingly, Louis maintains, state courts
tended to weigh the interests of resident plaintiffs heavily in the balance, and
accordingly the limits of the due process clause became stretched to the point
of being essentially meaningless. Nor were the state courts likely to limit their
jurisdiction; their own self-interest 124 inclined them "to resolve jurisdictional
doubts in their own favor."' 125 Indicative of this attitude, Louis argues, is the
poor quality of many of the lower court decisions-particularly those in Shaf-
fer and World- Wide-in which difficult jurisdictional questions had been re-
solved in a cavalier fashion. At times the state courts completely ignored the
constitutional issue. 12 6
Against this background, Louis surmises that the Court refused to sanc-
tion any balancing test that allowed a state court to weigh the defendant's
interest against those of the forum and the plaintiff, since in practice this
would almost inevitably favor the plaintiff. Consequently, in its four most
recent cases the Court reversed the trend by setting a series of categorical rules
that mandated protection for defendants. This step was necessary, he believes,
because the Court could not effectively review "a multitude of factually di-
verse cases asserting jurisdiction,"' 27 especially given its already crowded
docket. Louis candidly acknowledges the limitations inherent in this tech-
nique; by looking primarily at defendants' interests, the "just" result is not
always achieved because important countervailing factors are left unconsid-
ered.' 28 Irrespective of this drawback, Louis believes that, on the whole, the
Court has outlined an acceptable doctrine:
The Court must set the limits of due process somewhere and no
doubt believes that its mechanical approach will usually produce the
right result, or will at least produce few very wrong and unfair ones.
Thus, justice would only rarely be served if the state courts were per-
mitted to search under a balancing approach for the random excep-
tion, which they, in their obvious self-interest, would perhaps too
often erroneously purport to find . . . . In close cases, state courts
will naturally tend to resolve jurisdictional doubts in their own favor.
And sooner or later one will announce a significant advance that the
others will soon be pressed to follow. Thus, under the relentless prod
124. The potential sources of that self-interest are certainly numerous. For example, an
affirmative jurisdictional finding may (1) allow the creation or augmentation of an estate
or fund for tax or local creditor purposes, (2) allow the assertion of state regulatory or
taxing authority, (3) provide a local forum for state residents, (4) allow more sympa-
thetic, and possibly more liberal, local juries and judges to decide issues and assess dam-
ages, (5) allow the choice of local substantive law, and (6) obviate the need for local
attorneys to seek out, rely upon and divide their fees with out-of-state counsel.
Id. at 431 (footnotes omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 423 & n.117.
127. Id. at 409.
128. Id. at 430-31.
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of local interest, the state's long arm will inevitably reach farther and
farther. 129
Louis will receive no quarrel here in his 'assessment that the Court essen-
tially has retreated to a defendant-oriented, territorially-based theory of juris-
diction. While such a diagnosis would be disturbing enough, a far more
serious concern is presented if he is right in his evaluation of what motivated
the Court to reach the solutions it did. In effect the argument casts serious
doubts on the efficacy of a main portion of the federalist structure of our gov-
ernment: the utilization of the full faith and credit clause to create a unified
national court system.
To appreciate the point being made here, we need to return for a moment
to the foundations of Pennoyer v. Neff. Justice Field viewed the states as com-
peting sovereigns, meaning that the exercise of jurisdiction by one inevitably
deprives another of ability to adjudicate. Obviously this is correct. 130 But the
result is troubling only to those who view the states as rivals, rather than coop-
erating members in a common effort to promote the welfare of a single popu-
lation. Evidently Justice Field embraced the former notion, for his
explanation of the Pennoyer doctrine equated the states with sovereign na-
tions. This aspect of the Pennoyer story has been recounted before, 13' so what
follows will be a brief summary.
Pennoyer owes a great debt to Joseph Story, whose celebrated treatise on
conflicts of laws 132 provided "the basic organization, the intellectual structure,
and much of the language"'133 for the opinion. From Story, Justice Field ob-
tained his theory of sovereignty, which, although originally intended for
resolving conflicts questions, was translated by Pennoyer into constitutional
doctrine.
Story borrowed heavily from continental jurists, Boullenois and Huber in
particular, the former of whom he quoted for the proposition that "all the laws
made by a sovereign have no force or authority except within the limits of his
domains."'134 Taking this expression to represent a "natural principle flowing
from the equality and independence of nations," Story elaborated: "It is an
essential attribute of every sovereignty, that it has no admitted superior, and
that it gives the supreme law within its own domains on all subjects appertain-
ing to its sovereignty."' 135 With this premise laid, Story stated the maxim that
later became the first point in Field's system: "[E]very nation possesses an
129. Id. at 431-32.
130. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 569 (1958).
131. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 16, at 259-72.
132. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1834). Ironically, Story was
basically a foe of states' rights and an advocate of strong federal powers. See J. MCCLELLAN,
JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 238-73 (1971).
133. Hazard, supra note 16, at 262.




exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory."' 36 From this
he deduced another principle, one that became the second and third in Pen-
noyer's constellation: "[N]o state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or
bind property out of its own territory, or persons not resident therein. . . for it
would be wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of the sov-
ereignty of any nation, that other nations should be at liberty to regulate either
persons or things within its territories."' 137 Whatever effect a nation's laws
would have in another country would depend, according to Story, solely
"upon the laws, and municipal regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its
own proper jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express or tacit con-
sent."'138 Story had derived this concept of comity from Huber; 139 it became
the fourth of Pennoyer's maxims. 40 Finally, in a separate part of the treatise
devoted to jurisdiction and remedies, Story added: "[N]o sovereignty can ex-
tend its process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject either persons or
property to its judicial decisions."'41 In this section Story also propounded the
"international point of view [of] jurisdiction," which he again borrowed from
Boullenois: "[J]urisdiction, to be rightfully exercised, must be founded either
upon the person being within the territory, or the thing being within the terri-
tory; for, otherwise, there can be no sovereignty exerted .... ,"142 These ideas
concerning limits on process were eventually the capstones of the Pennoyer
regime.143
Professor Kurland has stated succinctly the objection to Justice Field's
employment of the Story system: "[Tihe doctrines were borrowed from laws
relating to wholly independent sovereignties which were not relevant to juris-
dictions joined in a federation."' 144 Considered in an international sense,
Story's ideas are at least intelligible in that they define barriers inherent to a
setting in which a sovereign's ability to enforce a judgment appears as the
most important issue. Without the power to enforce a judgment, an attempt to
adjudicate is a futile act, unless other nations recognize the judgment by com-
ity. When transplanted to a federal union whose states are bound to honor
each others' judgments under the full faith and credit clause, these limitations
are simply beside the point. "The real question becomes not whether a state
could itself enforce a judgment, but rather under what circumstances the na-
136. Id. at 19; See also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722: "[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory .. "
137. STORY, .rupra note 132, at 21. See also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722: "[N]o State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. . . .The several
states are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of
power from all others .. "
138. STORY, supra note 132, at 24.
139. Id. at 24 n.l, 30.
140. 95 U.S. at 722: "ITlhe laws of one state have no operation outside of its territory, except
so far as allowed by comity.
141. STORY, supra note 132, at 450.
142. Id.
143. See 95 U.S. at 722: "[N]o tribunal established by it [a state] can extend its process beyond
that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions."
144. Kurland, supra note 130, at 585. See also 4 C. WRIoHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1064, at 207-08 (1969).
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tional power should be used to assist the extraterritorial enforcement of a
state's judicial decrees."' 45 Certainly the issue arises whether the judgment to
be enforced was rendered under fair circumstances; unlike the international
arena, this country has a neutral court for making such determinations. 46
When providing this neutrality, the Supreme Court need not be bound by
Pennoyer's definition of the constitutional due process guarantee. Justice
Field had explained that under the fourteenth amendment "the validity of...
judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State re-
sisted on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no juris-
diction do not constitute due process of law."' 147 By equating due process
analysis with the determination of jurisdiction to adjudicate, Pennoyer made
the former an empty shell to be filled with Story's maxims, thereby establish-
ing traditional jurisdictional bias toward the defendant14 8 as a constitutional
doctrine. Freed from this doctrinal prison, the court is at liberty to ask why
there should be any automatic weight given to either party.' 49 The due pro-
cess guarantee then serves to require "that a state court refrain from hearing a
case in which it could not render as complete or convenient justice as some
other court."' 50 Naturally, this represents a sharp departure from the World-
Wide Court's point of view. The fourteenth amendment would protect not
merely the defendant from an unfair forum, but also would stand as a source
for plaintiffs' rights, recognizing their entitlement to a reasonable site for the
lawsuit.
Returning now to Professor Louis, the disturbing aspect of his argument
is the extent to which it doubts the ability of the various states to engage in the
kind of cooperative venture necessary to realize a truly federal court system.
He may be right in asserting that the Court's latest rules were spawned by a
reaction to perceived immoderation on the part of state courts. One simply
never knows for certain about those sorts of things. What may be said is that
the Court responded improperly if it did.
Probably it is accurate that the Justices were less than thrilled by the qual-
ity of jurisdictional opinions from the state courts, especially in Shaffer and
World- Wide. 5 1 Yet anyone who reads a representative sample of petitions
145. Kurland, supra note 130, at 585.
146. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 113, at 1122-23.
147. 95 U.S. at 733.
148. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 113, at 1127-28; Note, Developments in the
Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 912 (1960).
149. See Dodd, Jurisdiction in PersonalActions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427, 439 (1929), quoted in
Kurland, supra note 130, at 591: "[I]t may be argued that a plaintiff has as much right as a
defendant to claim that the legal battle ought to be fought at his home."
150. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.30, at 662 (2d ed. 1977); see Note, supra
note 148, at 917.
151. The Shaffer Court's decision to resolve the "minimum contacts" issue (as opposed to
remanding with directions to dispose of the case under the standards ofInternational Shoe) might
have been influenced by the "cursory treatment," 433 U.S. at 195, given the jurisdictional ques-
tions by the Delaware courts. Interestingly, in the next Term, the Court heard another case from
Delaware, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which decided that a criminal defendant
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for certiorari realizes the generally low level of many opinions under review,
regardless of the subject. In partial defense of the state courts, it should be
considered that these usually overworked bodies have relatively little time to
engage in protracted discussions, particularly when the issues are well settled,
as they were in Shaffer. While this hardly excuses the opinions rendered, it
does counsel caution when attributing motives to the Court.
But this is really an aside. The main question is whether alleged self-
interest on the part of state courts demands rules that frustrate a more in-depth
approach to jurisdiction. Granted, the state courts generally have interpreted
their long arm statutes in favor ofjurisdiction, just as they have been liberal in
construing International Shoe and its descendants.' 52 In the abstract there is
nothing particularly improper about such a trend. A great deal of this can be
attributed to cases like Gray,153 which if anything have received good press
from the Court and commentators alike. Considering the declining burdens
imposed by interstate travel, coupled with the corporate use of national mar-
keting, it was virtually inevitable that a responsive system of jurisdiction
would have undergone expansion in recent years. 154
It is possible to find examples of excesses on the part of state courts, al-
though we must keep in mind that what is excessive to one may seem progres-
sive to another. For example, Louis abuses the doctrine of Seider v. Roth,15 5
which he terms a "questionable" 1 56 that resulted from the state courts' refusals
to recognize the unfairness of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Apparently the un-
fairness should have been obvious to the state courts since there had been
"frequent suggestions to this effect in the legal literature."'157 Placing matters
in perspective, it should be pointed out that Seider was received very poorly in
other state courts. Only three states adopted the practice,15 8 including New
Hampshire, which authorized it solely against defendants who lived in a
Seider jurisdiction. 159 A large number of other states rejected Seider, either
could challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting a search
warrant. The state courts had flatly rejected this proposition, refusing to hear evidence from the
defendant concerning the veracity of various assertions made in the affidavits used to obtain the
warrant in his case. After upholding the defendant's right to make such a challenge, the Supreme
Court ordered a remand: "Because of Delaware's absolute rule, its courts did not have occasion to
consider the proffer put forward by petitioner Franks. Since the framing of suitable rules to gov-
ern proffers is a matter properly left to the States, we decline ourselves to pass on petitioner's
proffer." Id. at 172. Dissenting in Shafer, Justice Brennan objected to disposing of the minimum
contacts issue in part on the ground that plaintiff had not yet had an opportunity to develop "a
proper factual foundation." 433 U.S. at 221-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 150, at § 12.14.
153. Professor Louis, in fact, uses the reaction to Gray as an example of the kind of "relent-
less" expansion that has supposedly taken place. See Louis, supra note 59, at 432 n.169.
154. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 144, at § 1068, at 243 & n.30.
155. 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966) (jurisdiction sustained by attach-
ing insurance policy of nonresident defendant).
156. Louis, supra note 59, at 424 & n.122.
157. Id.
158. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 326-27.
159. See Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H.
617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973).
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on statutory or constitutional grounds,'60 which is not the result to be pre-
dicted if Louis' premise about the states' self-interests is accurate. And any
generalizations about the flimsiness of the case's basic rationale have to con-
tend with its approval by Judge Friendly and an en banc majority of the Sec-
ond Circuit, 16' not to mention endorsement by some commentators.
162
The persistence of the Harris v. Balk variety of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
up until Shaffer is another matter; it is correct that state courts had not heeded
the advice of virtually every academic who had written on the subject. 163
Closely connected with this issue is that of so-called "tag jurisdiction," in
which the state court acquires jurisdiction only as a consequence of process
being served within the forum.' 64 Each is a product of Pennoyer's holding
that presence within the forum (either of the person or of property) would
support jurisdiction. Both Harris and tag jurisdiction contain the same essen-
tial flaw: cases potentially are directed to courts whose connection with the
plaintiff, the defendant, and the claim may be nonexistent;165 the vice is aggra-
vated when such a forum insists on applying its own substantive law.166 There
is now nothing to recommend these types of decisions, 167 but we should never-
theless be wary of inferring that their longevity was (or has been) due to a
species of state parochialism. On the question of tag jurisdiction, our impa-
tience with its continuing survival should be tempered by realizing how infre-
quently these cases arise. 168 Although commentators have continued to
pummel Grace v. MacArthur,169 they generally provide no more recent exam-
ples of the plague's havoc. Many potentially abusive exercises on this basis
have been curbed by the state courts' development of various defenses for the
tagged party, including the doctrine of fraudulent inducement into the juris-
diction' 70 and the privilege afforded to parties, witnesses, and lawyers attend-
160. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 327 n.13 (collecting cases); Silberman, supra note 5, at
50 n.79.
161. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), a den banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
162. See, e.g., Diamond, Seider v. Roth - 41ie and Well, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 545, 563-64
(1979). Silberman, supra note 5, at 97-98 (approving on condition that restraints be placed on
forum's choice of law); Williams, supra note 15.
163. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 35 n.4.
164. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"Myth
andForum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
165. See Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 102, 109-10 (1978) ("[intangible property is the reciprocal of the transitory action: intan-
gible property is an interest that can be sued on, and suit can be brought [prior to Shaffer] wher-
ever the obligor can be found.").
166. Fortunately, forums exercising transient jurisdiction do not inevitably insist on the appli-
cation of their own law. See Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice ofLaw, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 185, 202 (1976).
167. Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction made much more sense in the era before long arm statutes,
when it was difficult to pursue absconding debtors; its existence probably facilitated credit ar-
rangements that otherwise might have been jeopardized. See Kalo, supra note 103, at 1150-62.
168. See Lowenfeld, supra note 165, at 109 n.32.
169. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (jurisdiction upheld when defendant was served with
process while flying over the forum in commercial aircraft).
170. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 150, § 12.26, at 654-55. This defense applies as
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ing proceedings in the forum. 171 Another mollifying element has been the
increasing application by states of forum non conveniens as a means of dis-
missing suits with only a tenuous relationship to the jurisdiction. 172 These
mitigating features probably account for the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws' acceptance of presence-based jurisdiction.173
With respect to the states' reluctance to discard the quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tional basis rejected by Shaffer, it is surely relevant that the practice was sup-
ported by overwhelming authority, both state and federal.' 74 Moreover,
despite plenty of opportunities, the Supreme Court had not definitively inter-
vened to stop the states from employing a justification for jurisdiction older
than the Republic.' 75 Quite the contrary, for in Hanson the Chief Justice bi-
furcated his discussion into in rem and in personam issues, thereby giving the
imprimatur for that mode of analysis. Speaking of in rem actions, Hanson
recited that such jurisdiction was "founded on physical power. . . . The ba-
sis of the jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the forum State."'176 How were the lower courts to interpret
this expression? While Hanson went on to limit in rem jurisdiction over cer-
tain intangibles, it did not cast doubt on the continuing validity of this general
head of jurisdiction. Old habits die hard, especially when encouraged. At
very least it can be said that property owners should have been well aware of
the danger of suit--of being "haled into court"-and in many instances could
have planned accordingly.
This brings us to the larger issue underlying Louis' argument. If it is cor-
rect that the Supreme Court perceived the state courts to be getting out of
hand, who should it have blamed? After all, the states did not force the
Supreme Court out of the jurisdiction business for virtually a generation.
Now, after such neglect, we are told that the Court devised "mechanical" rules
in order to better "police" the process, the implication being that any balanc-
ing test would inevitably be diluted by the states in favor of their own resi-
dents. Any mere invitation to "balance" has that danger, which is the reason
why a body of case law needs to be developed to provide useful analogies-to
explain, in other words, how the various factors should be stacked. No such
guidance came from the Supreme Court. A dozen or so cases over the last
twenty years would have offered a chance to see if the states really were bent
on intransigence.
In fact, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the state courts
have been more constrained than Louis has suggested. During the first fifteen
well when the court gains quasi-in-rem jurisdiction through the plaintiffs tricking the defendant
into sending property into the forum. Id.
171. Id. § 12.25, at 651.
172. See id. at § 12.29; Werner, supra note 15, at 589-90. Admittedly, state courts have been
reluctant to dismiss on this basis when the plaintiff is a state resident. See id. at 590.
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 & Comment a (1971).
174. See, ag., id. at § 66 & Comment a, Illustrations 1-2.
175. See Kalo, supra note 103, at 1150-62.
176. 357 U.S. at 246.
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years after International Shoe, these courts generally did not interpret their
jurisdictional statutes terribly expansively; indicative of the force of linguistic
habit, they "often continued to use pre-International Shoe terminology.' 177
More recently, there have been scores of cases declining jurisdiction despite
the plaintiffs residency in the forum. 178 And a number of decisions can be
177. Note, supra note 148, at 1000.
178. See, e.g., Chavez v. Logansport State Hosp., 122 Ariz. 560, 596 P.2d 698 (1979); Maloof
v. Raper Sales, Inc., 113 Ariz. 485, 557 P.2d 522 (1976); Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112
Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24 (1975); Powder Horn Nursery, Inc. v. Soil & Plant Laboratory, Inc., 20 Ariz.
App. 517, 514 P.2d 270 (1973); Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d
783 (1968); Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assocs., 314 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1975) (and cases cited
therein); Lakewood Pipe of Texas, Inc. v. Rubaii, 379 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1980); Young v. Morrison, 220 Ga. 127, 137 S.E.2d 456 (1964);
Unistrut Georgia, Inc. v. Faulkner Plastics, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 305, 217 S.E.2d 611 (1975);
Kailieha v. Hayes, 56 Hawaii 306, 536 P.2d 568 (1975); Hurletron Whittier, Inc. v. Barda, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 443, 402 N.E.2d 840 (1980); Stansell v. International Fellowship, Inc., 22 Ill. App. 3d 959,
N.E.2d 149 (1974); Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Richards of Rockford, Inc., 215 Kan. 849,
528 P.2d 1248 (1974); White v. Golthwaite, 204 Kan. 83, 460 P.2d 578 (1969); Tube Turns Div. of
Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson Co., 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. App. 1978); Adcock v. Surety Research &
Inv. Corp., 344 So. 2d 969 (La. 1977); Riverland Hardwood Co. v. Craftsman Hardware Lumber
Co., 259 La. 653, 251 So. 2d 45 (1971); Latham v. Ryan, 373 So. 2d 242 (La. Ct. App. 1979);
Cambre v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 585 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Khalafv. Bankers
& Shippers Ins. Co., 62 Mich. App. 678, 233 N.W.2d 696 (1975), aft'd, 404 Mich. 134, 273 N.W.2d
811 (1978); Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110,
117 N.W.2d 732 (1962); Breckenridge v. Time, Inc., 253 Miss. 835, 179 So. 2d 781 (1965);
Mladinich v. Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 164 So. 2d 785 (1964); Livestock Services, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 244 Miss. 531, 142 So. 2d 210 (1962); Dale Elec., Inc. v. Copymation, Inc., 178
Neb. 239, 132 N.W.2d 788 (1965); Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895,
328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972); Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783
(1968); McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1967); Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 20 N.Y.2d 13, 228 N.E.2d 367, 281
N.Y.S.2d 299 (1967); Kramer v. Yog, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966);
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261
N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965); M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale &
Sons, Inc., 26 A.D. 2d 52, 270 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1966), aj'd 20 N.Y.2d 903, 232 N.E.2d 864, 285
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1967); Simonson v. International Bank, 16 A.D.2d 55, 225 N.Y.S.2d 392, aj'd 14
N.Y.2d 281, 14 N.E.2d 281, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964); Old Westbury Golf& Country Club, Inc. v.
Mitchell, 44 Misc. 2d 687, 254 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1964), a'd, 24 A.D.2d 636, 262 N.Y.S.2d
438 (1965), aff'd 18 N.Y.2d 670, 219 N.E.2d 868, 273 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1966); Muraco v. Ferentino,
42 Misc. 2d 104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964); United Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 296
N.C. 510, 251 S.E.2d 610 (1979); H.V. Allen Co. v. Quip-Matic, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 40, 266 S.E.2d
768 (1980); Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Eways, 46 N.C. App. 466, 265 S.E.2d 637 (1980);
Modern Globe, Inc. v. Spellman, 45 N.C. App. 618, 263 S.E.2d 859 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v.
General Funding Corp., 30 N.C. App. 172, 226 S.E.2d 527 (1976); William R. Andrews Assocs. v.
Sodibar Syss. of D.C., Inc., 28 N.C. App. 663, 222 S.E.2d 922 (1976); Spartan Leasing, Inc. v.
Brown, 19 N.C. App. 295, 198 S.E. 2d 583 (1973), vacated on other grounds, 285 N.C. 689, 208
S.E.2d 649 (1974); Jahner v. Jacob, 252 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1977); Wainscott v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry., 47 Ohio St. 2d 133, 351 N.E.2d 466 (1976); Schatel v. Weitz, 40 Ohio App. 2d 95, 318
N.E.2d 172 (1974); Hudson v. Hudson, 569 P.2d 521 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); State ex rel. Sweere v.
Crookham, 289 Or. 3, 609 P.2d 361 (1980); Whalen v. Walt Disney World Co., 418 A.2d 389 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980); Stepnowski v. Avery, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 340 A.2d 465 (1975); W.B. Duna-
vant & Co. v. Perkins, 498 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1973); U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553
S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). Sun-X Int'l Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d
761 (rex. Ct. App. 1967); Trinity Steel Co. v. Modern Gas Sales & Serv. Co., 392 S.W.2d 861
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Davis v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc., 133 Vt. 317, 339 A.2d 456 (1975);
O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963); Danville Plywood Corp. v.
Plain & Fancy Kitchens, Inc., 218 Va. 533, 238 S.E.2d 800 (1977) (per curiam); Oliver v. American
Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967); Hodge v. Sands Mfg. Co., 151 W. Va. 133,
150 S.E.2d 793 (1966); Hasley v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 562, 235 N.W.2d 446
(1975); Nagel v. Crain Cutter Co., 50 Wis. 2d 638, 184 N.W.2d 876 (1971).
Added to this list are the large number of cases from federal district courts in which jurisdic-
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found in which one state gives full faith and credit to another's judgment, even
given the potential for protecting resident defendants by denying that the sister
state had jurisdiction.' 7 9 Why would there be so many cases like these if the
forces of local interest dominate?
It seems more productive to pursue another explanation for the Court's
latest tack. As suggested earlier, the decisions since International Shoe have
not rested on a single approach to jurisdiction; rather, they combine contradic-
tory aspects of the past, leading to a situation in which lower courts under-
standably have not been able to see the light. °80 This theme needs to be
pursued.
IV
Perhaps it could be maintained that the Supreme Court really was doing
the lower courts a favor by deciding World- Wide in the way it did. Balancing
tests require judicial energy, more so than the application of a rule which
sharply limits the range of relevant considerations. It might be added that in
the main the Court's procedure will achieve equitable results, since by and
large a jurisdiction lacking minimal contacts with the defendant is unlikely to
be designated a fair forum under a balancing process. Professor Louis lends
support to this view by contending that "[o]bviously the national power should
be withheld when a defendant has no contacts with the forum state, which
asserts what amounts to nationwide service of process."' 8 ' Using this assess-
ment as a starting point, our utilitarian advocate would then discount any in-
justice by pointing to the offsetting economies resulting for the whole judicial
system.' 8
2
This suggested defense for World- Wide highlights some real obscurities in
its method. On the one hand, it is assumed that "mechanical" tests relieve the
burden of analysis, which is not necessarily true. While it may be "obvious"
tion was denied on the ground that application of a state long arm provision would exceed consti-
tutional limitations; see generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at §§ 1067-1075, at 224-316 (1969 & Supp. 1980). Presumably a
federal district judge would share many of the same biases attributed by Professor Louis to state
court judges.
179. See, e.g., Einhorn v. Home State Savings Assoc., 256 So. 2d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971);
Bailey v. London Marina, Inc., 151 Ga. App. 73, 258 S.E.2d 738 (1979); Masters v. ESR Corp., 150
Ga. App. 658, 258 S.E.2d 224 (1979); Kolman v. National Racing Affiliates, Inc., 64 IM. App. 2d
61, 212 N.E.2d 313 (1965); Dodson v. Fontenot, 285 So. 2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Robinson v.
Merlite Land Sea & Sky, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 462, 305 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1969), a f'd per
curlam, 64 Misc. 2d 911, 316 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App. T. 1970); Esser v. Cantor, 55 Misc. 2d 235, 284
N.Y.S.2d 914 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.), aff'dper curiam, 55 Misc. 2d 720, 286 N.Y.S. 2d 389 (App. T. 1967);
Poindexter v. Willis, 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 256 N.E.2d 254 (C.P. 1970).
180. Some lower courts have complained rather forcefully about the lack of guidance from the
Supreme Court in the area of personal jurisdiction. See, eg., Powder Horn Nursery, Inc. v. Soil &
Plan Laboratory, Inc., 20 Ariz. App. 517, 514 P.2d 270 (1973).
181. Louis, supra note 59, at 430 n.163.
182. Anyone making such an argument would have to lower expectations for cost savings by
factoring the incredible persistence of American lawyers into the equation. Not only will briefs
and oral arguments continue to bring every conceivable factor to the courts' attention, but we can
expect new levels of ingenuity directed toward persuading the trier that the defendant has satisfied
the threshold erected by World- Wde.
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to some that a state should not be allowed jurisdiction when the defendant has
"no contacts" with the forum, it is not always obvious when such contacts are
lacking. A second consideration relates to the apparent assumption that it is
usually "unfair" to require a defendant to answer a lawsuit where he or she
has "no contacts." What is assumed here is that there is some relationship
between a lack of "contacts" and the issue of fairness; this is an assumption
that will not withstand scrutiny.
International Shoe started us on the "contacts" road, but it was an easy
case on the facts-there was no real doubt that the corporation had extensive
ties with Washington. Likewise, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co. 183 presented a defendant that undeniably had substantial dealings with
the forum-essentially its entire corporate activity was located there. Cases
like McGee were more difficult, although not terribly so; defendants had di-
rected business to a state in a tangible fashion, making what amounted to a
physical presence. All of these were situations in which the ordinary use of the
word "contact" clearly would apply.
Inevitably a case like Hanson had to come along, in which the defendant
had neither carried on business in the forum, nor originally entered into an
agreement with a resident of the state. 184 Any number of tools could have
been used to crack the problem, including the dissenters' argument that the
Court should consider the relationship of the trust to the Florida probate pro-
ceedings, the convenience of resolving all issues related to the estate in one
proceeding, the burdens on the parties, and the interests of the respective
states.' 85 Instead of choosing one of these paths, the majority followed a mazy
route which, while arriving at the correct destination, completely lost the trav-
eller along the way.
Earlier in this Article' 86 it was explained that the Hanson Court's insis-
tence on "contacts" between defendant and the forum was a direct product of
"territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." 187 After saying
this, Chief Justice Warren went on to indicate why the trust company had
insufficient "contacts" with Florida. His reasoning was mostly negative, con-
sisting of a list of all the things the company had not done in Florida-no
business was conducted or solicited there, none of the trust assets were located
in the state, and the underlying transaction was consummated outside the ju-
risdiction. 188 A discussion of McGee followed, which might have stopped af-
ter the Chief Justice distinguished the case by pointing to the defendant's
having sought out interstate insurance business from a California resident
183. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
184. When the trust agreement was created, the settlor was a domiciliary of Pennsylvania;
subsequently she moved to Florida, where an action naming the trustee as a defendant was com-
menced. See 357 U.S. at 238-41.
185. Id. at 258-61 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Burton & Brennan, JJ.); 1d. at 262-64
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
186. See text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
187. 357 U.S. at 251.
188. Id. at 251-52.
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through the mails. 189 Matters were not left there. Hanson went on to stress
California's special jurisdictional statute, which embodied an interest in "pro-
viding effective redress for its residents when nonresident insurers refuse to
pay claims on insurance they have solicited in that State."' 190 No such statute
was present in Hanson. Having completed this detour through an issue not
strictly related to the defendant's connection to the state, the Chief Justice pro-
ceeded to discount the interest Florida did have, assuring a convenient forum
for the resolution of all issues relevant to distributing the estate. Hanson dis-
avowed finding jurisdiction on the ground that Florida was the "'center of
gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation."' 9'
Rather, the Court required "some act by which the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 192 In determining if
defendant has had this relation with the forum, the state could not rely on the
"unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant."' 9
3
Evidently the Hanson majority had in mind a special meaning for "con-
tacts," one much narrower than common usage suggests. Surely the trust com-
pany had contacts with Florida in some senses: it carried on business with a
resident, sending mail to her there; profits were received from the Florida resi-
dent as a consequence of the business; the will, which contained a residuary
clause having the potential of distributing the trust assets, was to be adminis-
tered in Florida; the settlor retained substantial rights with respect to trust
investments and appointments, all of which were exercised in Florida; and the
primary trust beneficiaries were residents of Florida. Why didn't these count
toward determining if the defendant was "purposefully. . . conducting activi-
ties" in the forum, particularly when it continued the relationship for eight
years, deriving profits all the while? 194 The Court's answer was that defendant
had not "invok[ed] the benefits and protections" of the forum's laws.' 95 But
that expression is capable of the most elastic interpretations. Why did the trust
company benefit from the forum's laws any less than the insurance company
in McGee? Arguably the insurance company gained indirectly from regula-
tory laws allowing its industry to exist and prosper in California, but much the
same could have been said in Hanson. Florida laws protected communica-
189. Id. at 251.
190. Id. at 252.
191. Id. at 254.
192. Id. at 253.
193. Id.
194. Generally, a trustee may resign only with permission of an appropriate court, or upon
obtaining the consent of the beneficiaries, or under the terms of the trust. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 106 (1959). Unlike some states, Delaware has no statute governing resig-
nations, nor does there appear to be any case authority directly on the subject. The trust agree-
ment in Hanson did not cover the possibility. See Record at 17-29, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958). Other jurisdictions have ordinarily allowed resignation by judicial permission "if such
resignation will not be unduly detrimental to the administration of the trust." RESTATEMENT,
supra, at § 106 (Comment on Clause (a)).
195. 357 U.S. at 253.
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tions with the company's client, allowed appointments under the trust, pro-
vided an environment conducive to business relations, and would have offered
a forum for suits by the trustee against the settlor.
None of this mattered to the Hanson majority since the action arose in
Florida as a consequence of the settlor's unilateral decision to move there.
The notion of "benefitting from the forum's laws," then, had been given a
limited construction. In some way the defendant must initiate a beneficial re-
lationship with the jurisdiction.
The rationale for this circumscription cannot be gleaned from the Hanson
opinion. We are told nothing more than that it is a natural result of territorial
sovereignty. What does this signify? Did the Court mean to say that a defend-
ant must be "present" in the jurisdiction in order to satisfy the requirements
specified by Pennoyer and Story?196 Surely this was not intended since Inter-
national Shoe had already exposed the intrinsic problem of an inquiry di-
rected toward ascertaining "presence" in the jurisdiction:
To say that the corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy the
due process requirements. . . is to beg the question to be decided.
For the terms "present" or "presence" are used merely to symbolize
those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which
courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due pro-
cess. 19
7
If "presence" was not the concern, did the Court intend to protect Dela-
ware from judicial encroachment by Florida? On reflection, the best justifica-
tion for the Hanson holding is that it allowed Delaware law to apply,198 a
result achieved by restraining Florida's jurisdiction. Yet the same end could
have been accomplished through the development of constitutional rules relat-
ing to conflicts of laws, something the Court has been reluctant to pursue.199
Whatever interest Delaware had in this controversy would have been fully
vindicated by a proper application of its laws. Achieving that aim through a
jurisdictional ruling actually disserves Delaware by adding another case to its
dockets; 200 likewise the litigants suffer by being forced into an inconvenient
forum. 20 ' The only context in which the Court's jurisdictional deference to
Delaware makes sense is the international arena, in which jurisdiction follows
enforcement power, and in which recognition of foreign law occurs only
through comity. In a federal system there should be no apriori weight given
to a particular forum when each state is bound to recognize the others' judg-
ments. The only relevant considerations relate to applying the appropriate
196. See text accompanying notes 132-43 supra.
197. 326 U.S. at 316-17.
198. See Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REV. 695, 698-700 (1959) (arguing that choice
of law favored Delaware).
199. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 80 & n.257.
200. See Martin, supra note 166, at 202.
201. Perhaps it could be argued that Delaware would want to try the case in order to insure a
more accurate application of its laws. While there is something to be said for this, this concern
would surely vary with the complexity of the issues, and accordingly might constitute a factor to
be weighed in determining the best forum.
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law and selecting a forum that minimizes the impact of transaction costs from
the litigation.
This doctrinal fraility in Hanson is indicative of much more than a simple
lack of symmetry. Underlying the problems exposed above is a serious weak-
ness in the minimum contacts test itself. As long as the Court was dealing with
what amounted to a physical contact with the forum, the standard was easily
applied and produced few ill effects. When the cases became harder, the
search for "contacts" began to lose coherence. Originally the idea was to look
for "certain minimum contacts. . . such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "202 This
would imply a focus on the fairness of the forum selected by plaintiff. In Han-
son, however, the court emphasized the contacts themselves, as if they were
meaningful apart from the inquiry directed toward the fairness of plaintiffs
choice. When isolated, however, the word "contacts" is no more illuminating
than the old term "presence." Each represents a conclusion, rather than a
form of analysis-they are words to be used after we have decided that the
demands of the fourteenth amendment have been satisfied.
Whenever a court employs words as shorthand substitutes for explana-
tion, there inevitably arises a host of finely distinguished cases that display an
escalating tendency to become removed from the issues lying behind the origi-
nal words. A classic example is the "doing business" standard in vogue prior
to International Shoe, which developed as a means for ascertaining if a corpo-
ration was "present" in the jurisdiction or had "consented" to suit there. "The
law reports become cluttered with decisions as to what constituted 'doing busi-
ness.' "203 Distinctions were drawn by the courts based on a variety of factors:
whether there was a regular agency for solicitation; if business was continuous
and substantial, or involved only purchasers; whether activities were carried
on by subsidiaries, connecting carriers, or a regular office, and so on.2 °4 Many
of these auxilliary standards were clear enough in some situations; the diffi-
culty came in understanding why the various items should matter.
Similarly, the "minimum contacts" system supplies no better rationale for
accomplishing its purpose. What the Court has done is to develop secondary
standards to explicate the idea behind "contacts," the principal one being the
prohibition against considering "unilateral" actions.205 On closer scrutiny, the
term "unilateral" is nothing more thah a label for a conclusion. We may grant
that a forum with no relation to the defendant other than the plaintiffs unilat-
eral choice to file suit there ought not to be employed. The reason for this
202. 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
203. Kurland, supra note 130, at 584.
204. Id. at 584-85 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930)).
205. Professor Hazard summarized the first twenty years' experience with International Shoe
as follows: "Tlhe rule now amounts to this: a state can subject a person to its jurisdiction by
service of process anywhere in the country, so long as the litigation has substantiallocal elements."
Hazard, supra note 16, at 275 (emphasis added). But the expression "substantial local elements"
adds little of functional importance to the "minimum contacts" test. Rather, it tells us that de-
fendant must have some relation with the forum; the quality and quantity is not articulated with
clarity, and no justification is provided for the requirement.
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conclusion may be expressed by saying the plaintiffs contact with the state
does not matter, although a fuller explanation would point to a range of fac-
tors disqualifying the forum. Very few cases will be so simple. Usually the
defendant has some other relations, even though they may be merely a conse-
quence of a foreseeable move to the forum on the part of the plaintiff. We
then have to ask why defendants should not be tied to these forums, given
their pre-existing relations with the plaintiffs. Dismissing the case by invoking
the "unilateral" distinction does not provide any principled explanation. It
ends discussion without illumination, without providing any insight into what
is to be accomplished by the qualification other than an arbitrary deference to
defendants.
Nevertheless, Hanson came to an acceptable conclusion, albeit because an
appropriate choice of law was secured through the circuitous medium of per-
sonal jurisdiction. We may be tempted to conclude from this outcome that the
method used is capable of producing generally acceptable decisions with an
attendant savings in judicial effort.206 While this is a seductive deduction, it
fails to account for the essential tension inherent in using words that are the
products of contradictory theoretical traditions. The "minimum contacts" test
clearly differed from Pennoyer in many respects (the principal being the ex-
plicit recognition that process may be served extraterritorially), yet as has been
developed earlier, International Shoe and Hanson never abandoned the con-
cept that personal jurisdiction was founded on the powers of boundary-con-
strained sovereigns.207 To a large extent the contrast between the two sides of
the minimum contacts face has been disguised by substituting abbreviated ex-
pressions (such as "unilateral activities") for more extensive elaborations of
the supporting theories. These masks serve well enough when the drama
comes to a satisfactory conclusion. At some point, usually when the play has
left us more sad than wise, we begin to question what holds the plot together.
World- Wide seems to epitomize this problem, but it is not the only instance,
for the other recent cases-Shaffer, Kulko, and Rush-reveal a similar mal-
ady.
Of the three cases, Shaffer is the most egregious since the result (to deny
jurisdiction on the ground that defendants lacked minimum contacts with Del-
aware) seems plainly wrong. The odd aspect of the case is its cursory treat-
ment of this issue. After spending some sixteen pages detailing the history of
jurisdiction to adjudicate since Pennoyer and demolishing the distinction be-
tween in rem and in personam actions, Justice Marshall devotes only one-
fourth of that space to articulating why the defendants failed the minimum
contacts test. This last portion of the opinion might be called a case of studied
206. Professor Kurland has written: "[Hanson v. Denckla] is more restrictive of a state's judi-
cial jurisdiction than that urged by [Justice] Black, [but] it is nonetheless a workable and not
unduly confining expression of the limitations of the Due Process Clause." Kurland, supra note
130, at 621.
207. See id. at 623: "Denckla and Vanderbilt [Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957)]
reveal that the concept of territorial limitations on state power is still a vital one."
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obscurity, a deliberate attempt to resolve the dispute while creating the nar-
rowest possible precedential effect.
Shaffer makes the startling observation that the defendants "simply had
nothing to do with the State of Delaware."208 Unraveling this proposition
requires acceptance of an unusually narrow meaning for the words involved.
True, the defendants had never "set foot in Delaware," and the acts of alleged
corporate mismanagement took place outside of the state.20 9 In a way, this
sounds very much like a demand for some physical presence in the forum.
Looking at the matter from another perspective, the defendants were closely
linked to Delaware. Having accepted positions as officers or directors of a
Delaware corporation (or its subsidiary), they benefited from the favorable
management climate prevailing in the state.2 10 Their reputed misdeeds in-
volved abuses of fiduciary relationships that damaged the corporation, a crea-
ture of the state's laws, thereby injuring shareholders, who are protected by
Delaware law. Without even asking how many forum residents owned the
corporation's securities,2 1 we can still argue that deleterious effects were pro-
duced in Delaware. Since the recovery from a successful derivative action
falls to the corporation,212 a resident of the state, the harmful consequences of
an uncompensated loss would be felt within Delaware. Naturally this is a bit
artificial, given the fiction of corporate existence in the first place. Nonethe-
less, those who would seek to hide behind the fiction are, in this case, the very
ones who take advantage of the myth when it serves their purposes.
Justice Marshall acknowledges these kinds of arguments, but he dismisses
them as bearing only on choice of law, a subject Hanson had severed from
jurisdictional analysis. 2 13 Despite the undisputed interest of Delaware in a
just resolution of the controversy, Justice Marshall finds that concern insuffi-
cient to make the state "a fair forum." 2 14 No direct interpretation is provided
for this phrase, although evidently the reference is in part to the arguments
just discussed. In addition, there is introduced the cryptic expression that de-
fendants "had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court." 21 :5
The vacuousness of this test is nowhere more apparent than here. Without
repeating points made earlier, 2 16 it must have been clear to any knowledgea-
ble officer or director that Delaware had used the sequestration statute to com-
pel the appearance of nonresident corporate officials.2 17 If the Court means
something other than a lack of predictability of being sued there, the only
remaining possibility is that the defendants would not have expected the fo-
208. 433 U.S. at 216.
209. Id. at 213.
210. Id. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. A showing of this sort, which the Court did not give plaintiff an opportunity to make,
could have brought the "effects" of the out-of-state acts within the Gray rationale.
212. Id. at 222 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 215-16.
214. Id. at 215.
215. Id. at 216.
216. See text following note 91 supra.
217. See 433 U.S. at 227 nn.5-6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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rum to meet the minimum contacts test. Confining the defendants to reason-
able expectations, the circle is closed: "haled into court" becomes another way
of asserting (without proving) the fairness of the forum.
Justice Marshall's other rebuttal to the recognition of Delaware's interest
points to the forum's failure to have enacted a special jurisdictional statute
covering corporate officials. The relevance of this is fairly mysterious consid-
ering that the opinion concludes by stressing defendants' lack of "contacts, ties,
or relations"218 as the reason for jurisdictional failure. These hardly can be
supplied by a jurisdictional statute.219 If Justice Marshall intended to buttress
the "haled into court" argument, he was somewhat more successful, although
not overwhelmingly so, since the sequestration statute remained.
All told, this aspect of Shaffer is a disappointing reminder of the hold
Pennoyer still exerts. While purporting to rest on an evaluation of "fairness,"
the inquiry translates that term into "contacts," which in turn amounts to a
search for some sort of literal presence in the jurisdiction. No argument is
given to demonstrate why Delaware's manifest interest is counted only toward
choice of law, other than a citation to Hanson, which had merely asserted the
divorce of jurisdiction and choice of law principles. What Justice Marshall
ignores is that the forum's concern transcends the mere desire to see its laws
properly applied.220 Far more important in this instance is an interest in pro-
viding a forum in which the controversy can be best resolved. Considering the
interstate character of the alleged wrongs, Delaware might have been the only
place capable of serving the majority of directors with process (even account-
ing for the failure of the sequestration statute to reach non-stock owning direc-
tors). Of course we do not know for certain if this is true; the Court failed to
give the plaintiff an opportunity to take discovery on this factor. But its re-
fusal to remand for more complete investigation can be interpreted as saying
that nothing the plaintiff might offer on this score would matter.221 Again the
"minimum contacts" approach curtails discussion in favor of a dogmatic def-
erence to defendants. At the same time the comprehensibility of the test itself
becomes ever more elusive.
Indicative of Shaffer's rigid stance is the opinion's failure to mention the
actual burden that would be imposed on the officers and directors from a Del-
aware lawsuit. Under Delaware law,222 as in a number of other states, 223
these defendants would have a right to indemnification against the corporation
for expenses (including attorneys' fees); such costs may be paid by the corpora-
tion in advance.224 Even when unsuccessful in their defense, the officers and
218. Id. at 216. This is, of course, the familiar line from International Shoe. As in Hanson,
and later World-Wide, the Court omits International Shoe's supporting citation, which is to Pen-
hoyer. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
219. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 66.
220. Admittedly this interest is vindicated if another state fairly interprets Delaware's laws.
See text accompanying notes 199-201 supra.
221. The other explanation has been addressed earlier. See note 151 supra.
222. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1974).
223. See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 5, 6 (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1973 & Supp. 1977).
224. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (1974).
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directors may be indemnified if they can show that their actions were non-
negligent, taken in good faith, and not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation.225 Most states have some statutory authority for indemnification;
others recognize a common-law right when the defense prevails.226 Finally,
provisions for indemnity are often inserted in corporate articles, by-laws, reso-
lutions, and contracts.227 We may recall International Shoe's express acknowl-
edgement that an "estimate of the inconveniences" resulting from litigation
was "relevant" to the determination of whether minimum contacts exist.228
The construction given to "contacts" by Shaffer-and continued through
World- Wide--excludes consideration of the real costs facing the defendant.
On the surface Kulko appears much more acceptable than Hanson and
Shaffer; the case seems to avoid placing conclusive weight on the single varia-
ble of the defendant's "contact" with the forum. If anything, Kulko might
come under fire for having listed so exhaustively the relative interests of the
parties and the respective states229 that it becomes hard to assign values to the
various factors enumerated. A balancing process can have exactly this unde-
sirable result-the court simply runs through a catalogue of competing consid-
erations, eventually to conclude with the bare assertion that the better view lies
with one side or the other.230 Kulko cannot be accused of this shortcoming.
The opinion does present an unusual degree of difficulty stemming from its
somewhat chaotic organization; issues are discussed with little apparent order,
making it seem as if the Court has failed to indicate which are the most deci-
sive. After penetrating this barrier, one is left with the definite impression that
no balancing is occurring at all. Rather, Justice Marshall has produced the
domestic relations counterpart of Shaffer and, as such, much of the opinion
amounts to sheer window dressing.
In its formal restatement of the minimum contacts test, Kulko acknowl-
edges that "the interests of the forum State and of the plaintiff" are "to be
considered."23 1 Immediately thereafter the Court eviscerates this opening to
225. See id. § 145(b).
226. See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 5, 2 & 3 (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1973 & Supp.
1977).
227. See id. § 5, B (2d ed. 1971).
228. 326 U.S. at 317.
229. The Court discusses each of the following: the insignificance of defendant's limited pres-
ence in the forum some 13 years prior to the action, 436 U.S. at 92-93; the possible discouragement
of reasonable visitation and custody agreements from a finding ofjurisdiction in a state other than
that of marital domicile, id. at 93, 97-98; that the children's presence in California benefited them,
rather than the father, id. at 94 n.7, 94-97; the failure of defendant to have caused physical injury
in the forum, id., at 96; the noncommercial nature of defendant's relation with California, id. at
97, 100, 101; that the marriage centered in New York, the separation occurred there, and the
separation agreement was consummated in New York, id. at 97; defendant's inability to foresee
that his acts would lead to the burdens of litigation in California, id. at 97-98; the ability of the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968 to accommodate California's
interests in the children's welfare, id. at 98-100; the forum's lack of a special jurisdictional statute,
id. at 98; and the defendant's obligation to pay all of the plaintiff's litigation expenses, thus reduc-
ing the burden of a New York trial, id. at 95 n.8.
230. Some of the jurisdictional decisions display this tendency. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Cooper
Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971).
231. 436 U.S. at 92.
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non-defendant considerations by adding: "[A]n essential criterion in all cases
is whether the 'quality and nature' of the defendant's activity is such that it is
'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that State."'232
These two statements are remarkably incongruous, despite their juxtaposition.
Why should the Court "consider" something that in the end does not matter?
The only reconciliation would come by treating the latter as a threshold obsta-
cle which, if overcome, allows a court to address the other issues. One of the
confusing aspects of Kulko is that these non-defendant factors are reviewed by
the opinion, even though the Court stresses the insufficiency of defendant's
contacts with the forum.
Kulko emphasizes repeatedly that defendant had no association with Cal-
ifornia, especially nothing of a commercial nature.233 His only substantial
connection came as a consequence of the plaintiff's move to the forum, a "uni-
lateral" act over which he had no control.234 While the children eventually
followed their mother to California, the Court notes that it was they who bene-
fited from the new residency, not the defendant. 235 Everything else about the
case pointed back to New York: it was the place of marital domicile and con-
summation of the separation agreement. 236 Put bluntly, the defendant had
stayed in New York, and now the plaintiff expected him to litigate on the other
side of the country.237 This was too much for the six-man majority. Defend-
ant could not anticipate "being haled before" the California tribunal when he
acquiesced in his children's decision to move West.238
The remainder of the opinion is superfluous if we take seriously the
Court's elucidation of the core requirements for minimum contacts. By in-
cluding extended discussions of such matters as the Revised Uniform Recipro-
cal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968 (URESA),239 the Court may have
simply been demonstrating that its construction of the minimum contacts test
was capable of achieving fair results. Unfortunately, the Court overlooks
some serious structural problems in URESA that make it an unattractive alter-
native to a hearing in which both parties (and dependents) may appear and
present live testimony.240 Moreover, the end result of the URESA system is a
proceeding before a trier who physically is removed from those who require
232. Id.
233. Id. at 97, 100, 101. While the marriage occurred in California, as well as two brief mili-
tary stopovers, the Court rightly saw these as being jurisdictionally irrelevant given their remote-
ness from the present action. Id. at 93.
234. Id. at 93-94.
235. Id. at 94-96.
236. Id. at 97.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 97-98.
239. Id. at 98-100.
240. Primarily designed as a means for enforcing support obligations from absconding
spouses, see Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 12 FAM. L.Q. 113, 113-14
(1978), URESA contains imperfections inherent in a scheme designed to assist those in need of
support who cannot afford to track down the absent spouse. Under URESA, the person owed
support (obligee) initiates the action in her home jurisdiction; the actual proceedings are con-
ducted in the defendant's (obligor's) jurisdiction, with the obligee relyin on paper submissions to
prove her case. A court-appointed attorney (usually from the local district attorney's office) often
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support; the court will most likely have little idea of the social and economic
conditions in the community where the dependents are residing.24 1
Whatever may be the flaws in URESA, Kulko might still be seen as com-
ing to a tolerable conclusion since New York remains an available forum and
the father is obligated by the support agreement to pay the mother's expenses
associated with prosecuting the action there.242 Yet given the father's obliga-
tion to bear the burdens of litigation, the choice of forum is really insignificant
from a standpoint of costs. The Court's emphasis on his inability to foresee
the "substantial financial burden '243 of California litigation is factually inac-
curate-presumably the burden of his traveling to California is the same as
the reverse process. 244 He may not have had the prescience to predict that
California would be the forum, but he did agree to pay the expenses of long-
distance litigation. Despite the essential irrelevance of the financial burdens,
the Court forces the action to a location far removed from the locale now
having the greatest interest in the children's welfare, and the best facility for
judging their needs.
This aspect of Kulko demonstrates the essential arbitrariness of the
method employed. Taking the case to be a contest between two parties, with
decided weight given to one side, the Court ignores those who suffer most
from the jurisdictional wrangling-the children. Naturally the Court should
have considered, as it purported to do, the possible adverse effects on volun-
tary custody and visitation agreements of a rule that always required the sup-
porting spouse to follow a mobile counterpart. Not every case will present this
danger, as the facts of Kulko suggest. In addition, the Kulko situation (in
which the supporting parent remains in the marital domicile while the depen-
dents depart) is quite rare-normally the reverse occurs 24 5-meaning that a
case-by-case approach would not demand exceptional judicial resources.
Probably the best overall solution would involve the initial divorce court's su-
pervising a negotiated agreement on how the burdens of litigation will be
prosecutes the case for the obligee. See id. at 115-33 (description of URESA). Professor Fox
notes that while the obligor may make a personal appearance,
the obligee is normally restricted to a presentation solely on paper, a device which usu-
ally lacks the power and effect of oral argument. Even with the use of depositions, the
hearing can take on a ping-pong effect (an obligee's deposition gives rise to a response by
the obligor which triggers a second deposition by obligee to which the obligor responds,
etc.) all of which may take a significant amount of time and several continuances.
Id. at 128-29. Some suggest that the lack of a personal appearance by an obligee results in re-
duced support duties. See Note, Interstate Enforcement of Support Obligations Through Long Arm
Statutes and URESA4, 18 J. FAm. L. 537, 541 (1980). Additional problems confront those obligees
who must rely on the public prosecutor to pursue the obligor- prosecutorial indifference (manifest-
ing itself in unprepared counsel and delays) has been frequently cited as a significant flaw in the
program. See id.; Fox, supra, at 124.
241. Thus, in Kulko a New York judge must evaluate the support required in an area about
which he probably has no personal knowledge. The trier may have difficulty assessing such mat-
ters as an asserted need for private education, or the obligee's contention that employment pros-
pects are unpromising.
242. See 436 U.S. at 95 n.8.
243. Id. at 97.
244. It could be more, in fact, if the New York court desired an examination of the children.
245. See Note, supra note 240, at 553.
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shared, with the forum choice depending on where the dependents are residing
permanently. Compulsory arbitration might be required to resolve any later
disputes. This necessarily requires viewing jurisdiction as involving something
other than paying close attention to state boundaries. Instead the issue is find-
ing the best forum for protecting the dependents' interests, a goal which is
obtainable only if we regard the state courts as cooperating entitites. Parents
have obligations arising from their decision to bear children, including the
duty to share litigation costs associated with their protection; those responsibil-
ities should be the overriding determinant of the jurisdictional choice.
It is difficult to say what ramifications Kulko will have both on the do-
mestic relations front and elsewhere. One result may be that parents with cus-
tody will think very hard about a decision to move outside the state of marital
domicile, a constraint the Court never mentions. Beyond the support cases,
the logic of Kulko would seem to apply equally in the initial divorce and cus-
tody proceeding. Thus, a spouse who leaves to start a new life in another
jurisdiction would arguably be unable to initiate divorce proceedings there,
regardless of her intent to make the new home a permanent residence. While
the Supreme Court has shown no inclination to abandon the domicile of the
divorcing spouse as a basis for jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage,246 the
force of Kulko seems to undercut that ground when the defendant has had no
contacts with the forum. Particularly with the general approval of no-fault
divorce247 and the serious arguments now made for eliminating the require-
ment of domicile for divorce jurisdiction,248 such an extension of Kulko has
little to recommend it. Given Shaffer's determination to consider all asser-
tions ofjurisdiction under the minimum contacts test, it is hard to see how the
Court can preserve the existing fiction that the marriage is a res subject to ex
parte dissolution. 249 Shaffer apparently did continue the in rem action
whereby the forum in which the property is located may extinguish rights of
nonresidents.250 While this makes sense when the defendant has placed prop-
erty in a jurisdiction (or accepted benefits from its location there, as in Mul-
lane), the movement of the marital "res" is something he cannot control. It is
much more like Harris v. Balk, falling squarely within the Court's disqualifi-
cation of "unilateral" acts.
Rush v. Savchuk,251 in which the Seider v. Roth-type action was declared
unconstitutional, came to an acceptable conclusion on the facts presented.
The reason has not so much to do with jurisdiction as choice of law, for by
depriving Minnesota of its adjudicatory base the Court probably made Indi-
ana the only available forum. Indiana would bar the suit either by following
246. See Garfield, The Transtory Divorce Actioxn Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era, 58 TEX. L.
REv. 501 (1980).
247. Id. at 523-24.
248. See Garfield, supra note 246.
249. Id. at 512.
250. See 433 U.S. at 208.
251. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
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its automobile guest statute,252 or applying its already expired statute of limi-
tations.253 Like Hanson, then, the effect of the jurisdictional decision is to
utilize the appropriate choice of law. Indeed, the primary evil flowing from
Seider-type cases is the application of the forum's substantive law to tort ac-
tions that are the chief concerns of other jurisdictions.254
While the case might have been decided on conflicts grounds, the Court
instead rolled out its heavy artillery, flatly declaring that an attempt to link the
defendant to a jurisdiction via an insurer's contacts with the forum was
"plainly unconstitutional. '255 As in World- Wide (decided the same day),
Rush demands a demonstration of the defendant's "judicially cognizable ties
with a State" 256 before other factors may be reached (such as the forum's in-
terest in protecting a resident plaintiff by providing a forum). Added to this
was the Court's insistence that the Seider action was not the same as a direct
action against the insurer:
The State's ability to exert its power over the "nominal defendant" is
analytically prerequisite to the insurer's entry into the case as a gar-
nishee. If the Constitution forbids the assertion of jurisdiction over
the insured based on the policy, then there is no conceptual basis for
bringing the "garnishee" into the action.2
57
On one level this is correct-the insurer is liable only if the insured is held
responsible. Legalisms aside, the insurer is the real party, the one defending
and paying; the defendant cannot be bound by the result.258 Practically
speaking, the individual defendant may be damaged in a noneconomic sense
(by the attribution of wrongdoing), a point the Court notes.259 The question is
why this should render the Seider procedure invariably unconstitutional.
Every defendant faces some potential embarrassment when being sued, re-
gardless of where the proceedings are held. The usual Seider defendant,
whose interests will be protected by insurance counsel in any event, receives
the same defense (with no additional burdens) irrespective of plaintiffs forum
choice.
Generally we want tort cases tried in the place of the accident. Most
likely one of the parties will reside there, the evidence will be readily avail-
able, and that jurisdiction will have the strongest interest in the case. But there
may be times when these factors are not present: neither party may be a resi-
dent of the place of accident; no witnesses other than the parties might be
available; or the physical evidence could be negligible or readily movable.
Furthermore, acute hardships confront the plaintiff when there is no other do-
252. Id. at 322.
253. Id. at 322 n.2.
254. See Silberman, supra note 5, at 97-98.
255. 444 U.S. at 332.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 330-31.
258. See id. at 333-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 303-04
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Leathers, supra note 9, at 919.
259. 444 U.S. at 331 & n.20.
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mestic forum. Requiring the plaintiff in these situations to pursue a defendant
who will be represented by a national insurance company is really carrying a
good idea too far.
A final point about Rush is worth noting. Unlike Shaffer and Kulko,
there was a special jurisdictional statute in Minnesota authorizing the garnish-
ment of a "debt" arising from an insurance contract. 260 Despite the ambigu-
ous intimation in Shaffer that such a provision might have altered the
outcome, Minnesota's expressed interest was evidently of no consequence.
This was not an oversight on the Court's part; the author of Rush, Justice
Marshall, also wrote Shaffer and Kulko, and in his dissent Justice Brennan
referred explicitly to the statute.261 What may have occurred is that a majority
realized the inappositeness of any indication of forum interest to the initial
determination of the defendant's constitutional contacts. Rather than leave us
guessing, and further confounding the lower courts, they might have said what
was on their minds.
V
In many respects Pennoyer v. Neff can be said to have presented a unified
theory of jurisdiction. Resting upon a-view of the federal union that empha-
sized the soviereign nature of the states, the case provided a rather complete
picture of jurisdiction to adjudicate. A court knew it had authority over per-
sons and property within the state's borders since that was one of the attributes
of sovereignty. Likewise, it had no ability to reach those beyond the forum as
that would be intruding on other sovereign powers. Service of process was the
appropriate manifestation of the court's authority. Being the lineal descendant
of civil arrest,262 process could be envisioned as the symbolic representation of
the judiciary's sovereign powers.
Yet even as Pennoyer was decided it was evident that the unified base on
which it supposedly rested was unstable. For one thing, there were the "sta-
tus" cases, primarily divorces, in which Pennoyer allowed a domiciliary to sue
a nonresident for dissolution of a marriage. Here the Court found an easy
escape by declaring the "absolute right" of a state to determine "the conditions
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created,
and the causes for which it may be dissolved. '263 This particular "right" of
the state would, however, appear more relevant to choice of law, for there
remained the problem of justifying the assertion of power over a defendant
who was beyond the state's process. Oddly, P'ennoyer gave a highly pragmatic
answer to the jurisdictional quandary-if the state could not issue divorces,
"the injured citizen would be without redress" when the defendant "removed
to a State where no dissolution is permitted."'264 Similar considerations sup-
260. Id. at 322-23 n.3.
261. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262. See Leathers, supra note 15, at 12.
263. 95 U.S. at 734-35.
264. Id. at 735.
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ported an exception for the use of "consent" statutes requiring businesses to
appoint agents to receive process within the state; for corporations this "pro-
vide[d] a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, their obligations
enforced, or their charters revoked .... 265
These exceptions could be rationalized well enough within the Pennoyer
system: "status" cases might be analogized to property arrangements, with
something like a real entity existing in the state; the consent laws were a way
of requiring submission to state power as a prerequisite to conducting activi-
ties there. Nevertheless, the fit was awkward. To make the scheme work, the
Court had to take a rather special view of the marriage relationship and make
the assumption that the states could always exact consent as a condition for
doing business. Not too long after Pennoyer, the cohesive strength of its un-
derlying theory began to weaken. In part, the explanation was internal, such
as when the Court came to recognize constitutional limitations on the states'
power to exact consent. 266 Of greater significance was the transformation of
the American society as it entered the twentieth century; extraterritorial serv-
ice of process became a necessity.
International Shoe overruled no cases; rather it was an attempt to provide
"an appropriate rationale to demonstrate [the] consistency"2 67 of the decisions
after Pennoyer. As we have seen, the Court explicitly recognized the contin-
ued validity of Pennoyer. The opinion itself was extraordinarily ambiguous.
While the controversy presented was easily resolved, the reasoning provided
was capable of exploitation by two rival camps. It was possible to view the
case as opening the way for a type of constitutional forum non conveniens,268
modified to eliminate any nonprincipled bias toward one party or the other.269
Certainly cases like McGee could be seen as endorsing this interpretation. On
the other side, International Shoe might have been taken as a mandate to con-
tinue seeing the relation of the defendant to the forum as the basic concern of
the due process clause. Hanson was an example of this perspective.
Both of these positions were departures from Pennoyer, the former much
more so than the latter. Neither provided, in itself, a unified theory. The first
rested on a more fundamental premise, namely that the due process clause
ought to protect both plaintiffs and defendants, while at the same time serving
265. Id.
266. See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919). Nonetheless, the Court continued to employ
"consent" until at least 1933; see Kurland, supra note 130, at 582.
267. Kurland, supra note 130, at 589.
268. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Since Gilbert retained a bias
toward honoring plaintif's choice of forum, a more relevant analogy would be to cases authoriz-
ing transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976). See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29
(1955). The main point is that the kinds of issues addressed by the federal cases on dismissal and
transfer (and the way they are resolved) provide an alternative method for approaching statejurisdiction.
269. "Nonprincipled bias" here means a presumption for either plaintiffs or defendants that is
indulged in before examining the factual situation. A rule generally requiring plaintiffs to pursue
defendants in a forum is an example of such a bias. Note, however, that some fact patterns often
will produce a tendency to favor a certain party. For instance, in products liability cases, plaintiffs
should frequently be allowed a choice of forums. See text at notes 100-06 supra. In short, a bias
can be principled.
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the larger interests of a national society. With respect to the second, the
deeper structure is more elusive. What may be present is an unreflective con-
tinuation of the ancient favor afforded to defendants in these matters. Or, if
we take Hanson and World- Wide at their word, the defendant orientation is
itself grounded in a conception of the political powers retained by the states.
Regardless of the reason for giving weight to defendants, the inevitable result
is an analysis that must pay close attention to state boundaries. By initiating a
search for "contacts" with particular states, the courts are constrained to ask
what the defendant has done with respect to the forum. As in the days when
Pennoyer held unquestioned authority, the inquiry centers on whether the de-
fendant has committed sufficient acts to justify the state's exertion of power.
Evidently the Court has now chosen the second of the paths leading from
International Shoe, although its often obscure opinions, separated by a long
period of silence, left the imprint that should be expected when the lower
courts are told to follow contrary directions.
Those who saw Shaffer as somehow overruling Pennoyer simply missed
the import of both cases. To be sure, Shaffer brought together in personam
and in rem jurisdiction under one expression, and to that extent Pennoyer was
modified. But in this regard, the effect of the decision was to protect further
defendants' interests. Still, this feature of Shaffer does not capture the sense in
which Pennoyer survives; it is simplistic to assume that Pennoyer stood merely
for a strong tendency to assist defendants in avoiding process. This was the
symptomatic feature of the case, not the essence. Instead, the more fundamen-
tal aspect of Pennoyer was its insistence that constitutional limitations on juris-
diction to adjudicate were a function of the constraints associated with a
federation of sovereigns retaining independent judiciaries. In effect, the most
recent cases combine this aspect of Pennoyer with a modified account of the
relationship between the defendant and the forum that would suffice for al-
lowing an assertion of jurisdiction. Pennoyer had placed physical presence at
the center of this inquiry, but as the "status" and "consent" cases reveal, this
was never a necessary condition-it was merely sufficient. We may assume
that the Court will restrict "tag" jurisdiction whenever the occasion presents
itself, thereby eliminating mere presence as an adequate basis. When that day
arrives, the main point of Pennoyer will still persist: jurisdiction is acquired
when defendants bring themselves within the range of a state's power. Like
magnetism, jurisdiction is a force field surrounding the forum, pulling defend-
ants into its influence; when the force field is given too much energy, it inter-
feres with other sources of power.
There is some discussion in Shaffer and the cases following it of factors
beyond the contacts between the defendant and the forum. These are serially
subordinate concerns, a second inquiry to be reached after the initial determi-
nation. Accordingly, we can expect judicial attention to be drawn increasingly
toward distinguishing those contacts necessary to clear the initial hurdles.
This future will be marked by mounting frustration, with distinctions appear-
ing ever more arbitrary. The search for "contacts" is not simply beset by am-
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biguity-again, that is a symptom, not the disease. More fundamentally, the
theory itself lacks any kind of sustaining foundation. Asserting that the vari-
ous states must respect each other's powers says nothing about practical limits.
In a day when physical presence defined the relationship, the theory had the
appearance of workability. Having abandoned, at least formally, the concept
of presence, no reference is available to define the required contacts. Given
the strong tie between language and theory, it is not surprising that the "mini-
mum contacts" cases have been resolved by the implicit analogies to physical
presence. Likewise, considering the often-exposed frailties of the presence
doctrine, it is unremarkable that the reasoning of the decisions (despite occa-
sionally acceptable results) resists penetration.270
Any judicial system attempting to treat like cases alike is inexorably
drawn toward the promulgation of theory. Similarities and differences among
cases are noted through language, which abstracts elements from the many
particulars for comparison. A theory is a proposition that purports to establish
a relationship among otherwise discrete elements. Theories of law are inclined
to increase the scope of their coverage, to provide a more comprehensive
unity. In part this is the product of the constant appearance of new controver-
sies that demand resolution. Another side of the tendency relates to the desire
to leave no case outside of the justifying system; as the theory supplies the
rationale for the justice of the result, any case left beyond the theoretical pe-
riphery is relegated to a normative void. Such a case cannot even be discussed
intelligently: the language form demands abstraction in order to function,
which in turn is provided by theory.
There is nothing extraordinary, then, about the quest for a unified theory
of jurisdiction. The search is a reflection of human nature. And the judicial
system we know would not exist without the same aspects of human nature.
Caution is nevertheless in order. Any theory appears unifying, some more so
than others; the theory itself says nothing about its scope. It is the actual ap-
plication of the theory that demonstrates its sweep; yet we require additional
theory to determine when this application is appropriate. Similarly, the scope
of the theory is silent as to its fairness. Both the issues of scope and fairness
are resolved by still further theory. To the extent we employ language to or-
ganize the world, the regress will be perpetual. In the process we are captives
of our language, of the abstractions wedded to language.
Pennoyer v. Neff may be denounced, yet its influence continues. The the-
ory upon which it rests is deeply imbedded in our juridical language. We
remain in the grasp of a chimera.
270. Dissenting in World- Wide and Rush, Justice Brennan openly questioned the appropriate-
ness of continuing the "minimum contacts" approach, saying in part that 'It]he model of society
on which the International Shoe Court based its opinion is no longer accurate. Business people,
no matter how local their businesses, cannot assume that goods remain in the business' locality."
444 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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